ROK's choice has manifold implications

The Republic of Korea and Japan were scheduled to sign the General Security of Military Information Agreement on June 29, but the ROK decided to hold off signing it at the last minute because of public pressure and questions about what and how much the ROK will actually benefit from military intelligence exchanges with Japan.

Many people in the ROK opposed the move because of unresolved issues arising from Japan's colonization of Korea from 1910 to the end of World War II, such as territorial disputes and the Korean women forced into sex slavery during World War II. Many people in the ROK were also alarmed by the report submitted to Yoshihiko Noda, the Japanese prime minister, by a sub-committee of the Council on National Strategy and Policy that called for a reinterpretation of Article 9 of the country's constitution - the so-called no-war clause - so the country can exercise the right to collective self-defense.

The Republic of Korea will not reach a decision until the National Assembly has discussed the issue, but the agreement already has different strategic implications for the United States, Japan and the ROK.

Although the US is not a signatory, the agreement would be of great significance to it. The US wants to form a US-Japan-ROK military alliance, but the existing US-Japan and US-ROK alliances have failed to facilitate this. The prickly relationship between Japan and the ROK does not actually affect the US' strategic frontier in Northeast Asia, but it has undermined the effect of the US-Japan and US-ROK military alliances.

The US is now applying a containment policy in East Asia. The forging of a military partnership between Tokyo and Seoul would be a stepping-stone toward a trilateral military alliance that would facilitate the implementation of the US' regional strategy.

To Japan, an agreement with the ROK would mean much more than just the exchange of military intelligence. Over the past decades, Japan's military strategists, especially right-wing politicians, have been trying to circumvent the constitution, which restricts the country's military force to self-defense, and to give the country more leeway in military issues. After the sinking of the Cheonan, a ROK corvette, and with the US rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region, Japan sees more chances to realize its military ambitions.

Japan has already taken steps toward this end, such as expanding military cooperation with the Philippines, easing the decades-old ban on exports of weapons and revising its laws to pave the way for arming itself with nuclear weapons. By doing so, Japan is attempting to circumvent the restrictions imposed by its constitution and seeking to gradually expand the scope of its military activities. To sign a military intelligence protection agreement with the ROK would be another step forward.

As a party to the proposed intelligence-sharing agreement, the ROK is not setting its strategic sights beyond deterring the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. One of the driving forces for the ROK to sign the agreement with Japan is that the ROK lags behind the US and Japan in the field of military intelligence and it wants to share their intelligence. Also, the ROK blames the DPRK's aggressive acts on China's foreign policy, which it believes favors the DPRK, and thinks that signing the agreement with Japan can contain China.

But the ROK also has to weigh in the balance other considerations. If Tokyo and Seoul sign the agreement, uncertainties remain whether it will trigger an aggressive reaction from the DPRK, and whether it will push China, Russia and the DPRK into a trilateral alliance.

China and Russia will face intensified security pressure if Japan and the ROK sign the intelligence-sharing agreement. But they will not form a trilateral military alliance with the DPRK.

China's attitude remains a key matter of concern for the ROK, and that is why Seoul tried to approach China earlier about signing an agreement regarding an exchange of military supplies, which the ROK believes can somewhat overcome China's doubts.

If the agreement is signed, the DPRK will probably respond to the provocation by acting aggressively. This will further unsettle the region.

This will be the last thing the DPRK wants, because it will counteract the efforts made to stabilize Kim Jong-un's leadership and contradict Pyongyang's demonstrated will to open up to the outside world.

Therefore, how the situation in Northeast Asia evolves depends to a great extent on the ROK's policy choice and the DPRK's response.

The author is a professor of Korean Studies at Yanbian University, Jilin province.

(China Daily 07/12/2012 page9)