What does the future hold for relations between a fast rising China and a waning United States? Two experts give us different arguments but arrive at similar conclusions.
Dennis V. Hickey
China matters and matters a lot for the US
Since the establishment of New China in 1949, Sino-American relations have passed through several stages. From roughly 1950 until 1972, bilateral relations were severely strained; the two governments did not even recognize each other.
Because of the farsighted leadership of Chairman Mao Zedong and former US president Richard M. Nixon, however, this frosty relationship thawed during the early 1970s. A variety of economic, political and strategic factors contributed to US-China rapprochement, but strategic considerations were the driving force. Common opposition to the hegemonic aspirations of the Soviet Union brought the two governments together, and formal diplomatic ties were finally established in 1979. With the end of the Cold War, however, the strategic rationale for US-China rapprochement seemingly vanished. Concerns once overlooked for the sake of national security - including economic ties, human rights and military policies - became major issues of contention.
Since the 1990s, the US has been sorting out its relationship with China. Is the country a friend, an enemy or something else? Does it represent a threat or an opportunity for the international community? Where are Sino-American relations headed? Analysts and media pundits have been asking such questions for more than two decades. Perhaps this helps explain why the relationship has experienced a series of "ups and downs" and "twists and turns."
Many Americans support a policy of engagement with China. Although blasted by opponents as "Panda Huggers", or more recently, "Appeasers", they enthusiastically applaud China's reform policies, contend that China plays a constructive role in global politics and argue that it might best be described as a "responsible stake-holder."
Broadly speaking, the "Panda Huggers" claim that the US needs China's help to cope with a variety of international challenges. And they believe that harsh rhetoric and bullying is no substitute for rational dialogue and compromise. In short, according to their view, China ought to be viewed as a friend rather than a threat.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, one encounters those who promote an American containment policy for China. Described as "Dragon Slayers", these individuals support the use of "hard power" to cope with the rise of China. The "Dragon Slayers" want the US to maintain both its nuclear and conventional military superiority in the Western Pacific and employ "alliance diplomacy" as a means to thwart perceived Chinese territorial ambitions. For example, bolstering the US' security relationship with Japan is often cited as a means to "contain" China.
The "lunatic fringe" element in the second camp goes so far as to advocate a "preventive war" against China and/or support for separatist forces in the Chinese mainland and Taiwan.
To be sure, engagement and containment should be considered only as "ideal types" on the opposite ends of a broad spectrum of potential US strategies. Not surprisingly, current policy fashions elements of both approaches into an over-arching US grand strategy. Some describe this policy as "hedging".
What does hedging mean? In the business world, some investment companies purchase securities hoping that they will rise in value. But they also bet against some stocks to ensure that they will "win" even if the market suffers a downturn. This "hedging" strategy helps protect the companies irrespective of swings in the market. In a similar vein, the US has adopted a "hedging" approach toward China.
On the one hand, the US openly applauds China's reform policies and calls for close and productive relations. For example, US Ambassador to China Gary Locke said recently: "If our people, our business people, our scientists, our students, can really join together, we can solve not just the challenges and the problems facing each of our countries; we can actually solve many of the problems facing the entire world." On the other, Washington is hedging its bets. One does not have to look far for examples. For instance, the US is bolstering its security ties with Australia, Vietnam, Japan, the Philippines and some other countries.
Moreover, US President Barack Obama pledged recently that the US would make its military presence in the Asia-Pacific region a top priority. And the US has junked its neutral position toward disputes in the South China Sea and declared that it has a "national interest" in a multilateral resolution to settle competing claims.
It is not clear whether a policy of engagement or containment will dominate the US' relations with China in future years. But the "smart money" is betting on a policy closer to the engagement end of the scale - with some degree of "hedging" tossed in for insurance. This is because China's cooperation is essential if the global community hopes to resolve a wide range of critical problems, including the worldwide economic tsunami, international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, environmental degradation, health issues, dwindling energy supplies and the recurring crises on the Korean Peninsula, to name just a few.
Given the fact that China is the world's second largest economy, fastest growing economy, and the single largest foreign holder of US government debt, it is clear that the country is important to the US. Add to that fact that China is the largest exporter of goods (with 9.6 percent of the global share) and the largest holder of foreign exchange reserves (which now exceed $3 trillion), and it is easy to see that China matters - and it matters a lot.
Will such considerations influence Washington's relations with Beijing? You can bet on it. As Obama explained: "The relationship between the US and China will shape the 21st century . . . our ability to partner with each other is a prerequisite for many of the most pressing global challenges."
Times have changed. We are now living in an era of globalization and economic interdependence. Although some elements of a "hedging" strategy will continue to make sense for both sides because of problems left over from history and the realities of an anarchic international system, the US' containment policy should have been consigned to the trash heap of world history along with the Cold War.
The author is the director of the Graduate Program in Global Studies at Missouri State University and the author of numerous books and articles on East Asian politics.