Power shifting and sharing

Diplomatic approaches of new Egyptian government still evolving despite US' U-turn on talking to Muslim Brotherhood

Following Mohamed Morsi's narrow victory in Egypt's presidential elections on June 24, the international community has been anxiously watching the complex power struggle taking place between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, which assumed power after the ousting of former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak.

Mubarak was long viewed by the US as a strategic ally in the Middle East, and Washington extended unrestrained support to the Egyptian strongman's crackdowns on domestic extremist Muslim forces for decades. Not so long ago the White House even declared that, "Washington did not and will never talk with the Muslim Brotherhood".

However, the US is a realistic power, and knows it will have to change its approach following Morsi's victory. US President Barack Obama sent a telegram to Morsi congratulating him on his win and extended an invitation for him to visit the US in September. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton paid a brief visit to Egypt days after Morsi was sworn in and held talks with him and other factions. Along with her promises that the US will support Egypt's transition to democratic rule, Clinton also reiterated the US' offer of $1 billion in debt relief, and offered $250 million trade credit guarantees and a $60 million investment fund.

By extending an olive branch and the offer of assistance, the US was hoping to get a guarantee that Egypt will continue to abide by a peace accord it signed with Israel in 1979.

During her meeting with Morsi, Clinton said that Egypt should have "dialogue, compromises and real politics" on its road to democracy, remarks that show Washington is hoping that the Muslim Brotherhood will come to terms with the Egyptian military and not make any reckless moves. But clearly Washington has realized it can't stake its Middle East strategy on just one of Egypt's two big factions.

Considering the country's complicated political situation and the uncertainties still surrounding its internal and diplomatic policies, the US is likely hoping that the Muslim Brotherhood will basically carry forward the foreign policies of Mubarak's regime and Egypt's military authorities will maintain their close relationship with the Pentagon.

Maintaining Israel's security and curbing an intransigent Iran are at the heart of the US' Middle East strategy. But it has had to show that it is on the side of Egyptian people and revolution, so it has had to accommodate the Muslim Brotherhood and extend its support to Egypt's democratic transition.

However, to realize its democratic transition, Egypt still needs a power transition from the military to the publicly elected president. With the legislation, constitutional, budgetary as well as policymaking powers on foreign affairs still in the hands of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, the Muslim Brotherhood will not have much room to maneuver. So the US is caught on the horns of a dilemma. Without exercising full power over the country, Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood do not have the ability to make drastic adjustments to Egypt's policies toward the US and Israel, but unless it supports the transition of power from the Supreme Council to the government the US cannot claim to be supporting democracy.

Although Morsi has openly promised to comply with all the international treaties and agreements that Egypt has already signed, he declined to receive a congratulatory call from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and said Egypt will resume diplomatic ties with Iran. Egypt becoming closer with Teheran is something Washington doesn't want to see.

However, a closer relationship with Iran will enable Morsi to demonstrate that Egypt's diplomatic approach and values are different from those of the old regime. Such a choice is not only equivalent to extending a helping hand to embattled Iran, but will also show that the new government aims to contribute to Middle East security and stability through policies different from its predecessor.

The author is a researcher with the Institute of Western Asian and African Studies under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

(China Daily 07/19/2012 page8)