In 1992, the world made a promise: those most responsible for climate change would lead the charge in addressing it, while developing countries would receive the financial and technological support needed to pursue sustainable development. Yet, 34 years later, that promise remains unfulfilled.
The world has changed beyond recognition since the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, also known as the Earth Summit, in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. Clean technologies have transformed the economics of energy. China has emerged as a global clean-energy powerhouse. Emerging economies have gained geopolitical influence. And the United States is retreating from international climate cooperation.
What has not changed is the injustice in climate. Countries that contributed least to the climate crisis continue to suffer disproportionately, while wealthy nations have collectively failed to deliver the emissions reductions and financial support required.
This is the paradox of climate injustice: the world has more technological and economic capacity to confront climate change than ever before, but the failure to deliver justice continues to undermine the cooperation needed to solve the climate crisis.
The ongoing 31st session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, or COP31 in Turkiye, provides an opportunity to break this cycle. The UNFCCC was founded on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Developed countries were expected to lead in reducing emissions and support developing economies confronting a crisis they did little to create.
There has been some progress. Renewable energy has expanded, and climate finance has increased. However, the delivery remains inadequate. Over three decades of insufficient action have created a profound deficit of trust between developed and developing countries. This mistrust helps explain why climate negotiations repeatedly return to arguments about historical responsibility, finance and who should act first. The world has changed, and responsibilities must reflect evolving capabilities. But historical obligations do not disappear simply because other countries have become wealthier.
The US has compounded this problem. Washington never ratified the Kyoto Protocol. The Paris Agreement’s framework partly reflected compromises necessary to accommodate US domestic politics. Yet even those compromises failed to secure enduring participation. The lesson is not that the US should be absolved of its historical responsibilities. It is that international climate ambition cannot depend solely on Washington’s willingness to cooperate.
The European Union, China and other willing governments have an opportunity to build a coalition capable of sustaining climate ambition despite the US withdrawal and political pressure. This is not about creating an anti-US alliance, but ensuring that no single country can dictate the limits of collective action.
The conditions for such leadership are fundamentally different from those in 1992. China’s enormous investments in solar panels, batteries and electric vehicles have transformed the economics of clean energy. Technologies once prohibitively expensive are now increasingly competitive with fossil fuels.
There is a historical irony here: a climate convention founded partly on the expectation that wealthy countries would provide the technologies needed for the transition now operates in a world where one of the most consequential clean-technology powers is China, itself a developing country under the convention.
China’s technological capabilities present an opportunity to help developing countries access cleaner, more affordable energy. Europe’s opportunity is different. The EU has helped shape international climate ambition through its emissions targets and regulations, and it must continue strengthening its own transition away from fossil fuels. But its most consequential additional contribution could be restoring trust by championing climate finance.
For decades, wealthy nations have promised financial support to developing countries. The scale, quality and predictability of that support have consistently fallen short of what is needed. European governments frequently point to strained public finances. But this raises a fundamental question: who should pay for the climate crisis?
Fossil-fuel corporations have generated enormous profits while the costs of climate damage increasingly fall on taxpayers and vulnerable communities. Europe should champion making polluters pay through taxes on fossil-fuel profits, ending fossil-fuel subsidies and mechanisms to hold major polluters financially accountable.
These resources must complement, not replace, developed countries’ existing climate finance obligations. Climate finance is not charity; it is part of the original agreement that made international climate cooperation possible. Delivering it is essential to rebuild trust.
China, meanwhile, could help make the energy transition accessible across the developing world. Its contribution should extend beyond exporting clean technologies to include affordable financing, sustainable infrastructure, electricity grids, local manufacturing and skills development. Across Africa, Asia and Latin America, such investments could strengthen energy security, reduce dependence on fossil-fuel imports and create economic opportunities. But they must support national development priorities rather than create new dependencies.
The EU and China may have disagreements on trade, technology and industrial policy. Yet climate cooperation does not require agreement on every issue. Indeed, they could become constructive competitors in accelerating the global energy transition, driving innovation, lowering costs and expanding sustainable investment.
This cannot become an exclusive arrangement between two powerful economies. Climate-vulnerable countries must remain central to defining what justice requires. Other influential countries, including Brazil, India, Canada and the United Kingdom, must contribute according to their differentiated responsibilities and capabilities.
The objective is not to replace US dominance with another geopolitical hierarchy. It is to build a broader coalition capable of delivering climate action and justice, with or without Washington. The climate convention was founded on a promise of justice — a promise that must finally be fulfilled. Yes, the world has changed. So have the economics of energy and the geopolitical balance. The question is whether political leadership will finally catch up and deliver the justice promised in 1992.
The author is the deputy international program director at Greenpeace International.
The views don’t necessarily represent those of China Daily.
