The new multilateral institutions of the Global South promote more inclusive democratic representation in the international system and common development
The emergence of new multilateral institutions is one of the most significant developments in contemporary international relations. It reflects the changing distribution of economic power, the growing importance of developing countries and their demand for a greater role in shaping the international order.
Two questions arise. The first concerns legitimacy: How can the growing economic and demographic weight of the Global South be reconciled with its uneven representation in international decision-making? The second concerns development: What accompanying elements are necessary so that new institutions enable developing countries to pursue their own priorities, strengthen their productive capabilities and improve the lives of their populations?
These questions are connected. The ability to influence international governance matters not simply because it confers political status, but because international institutions help determine the conditions under which countries can develop.
Consider the international financial architecture. Voting power in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank reflects financial contributions and economic criteria rather than the principle of one country, one vote. Population is not a direct component of the IMF quota formula. Neither population nor sovereign equality is reflected in the same way as economic weight and financial participation. As a result, many developing countries lack adequate representation in global decision-making.
If the economic weight of emerging and developing countries changes, should not their institutional representation change accordingly? There is no universally accepted formula that reconciles economic weight, population and sovereign equality. But the criteria themselves should be open to discussion and reform. An international order cannot indefinitely claim to reflect global economic realities while treating the distribution of institutional influence as largely insulated from transformation.
This brings us to the debate over the so-called rules-based international order. International law has recognized sources and establishes legal obligations. The expression "rules-based order", by contrast, does not define a single, universally agreed legal framework. The two concepts can overlap, but they are not automatically synonymous. The question is not whether international relations should be governed by rules. It is what kind of rules, who makes them, through which procedures and whether they are applied consistently.
When emerging economies are described as seeking to revise established institutional arrangements, we should consider that they are not challenging international law itself but the distribution of power within existing institutions. Demanding more representative institutions means invoking a multilateral, more representative and therefore more democratic system, as opposed to the current unilateral — or at most "minilateral" — system in which only a few countries set the rules and run the show.
It is against this background that we should understand the emergence and diversification of multilateral institutions and South-South cooperation. These arrangements are not identical, nor do they constitute a single political bloc. Some provide finance, some offer platforms for political coordination, and others promote economic integration. Among those relating to financing, the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank mobilize resources for infrastructure and sustainable development. Political and strategic cooperation has developed through BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In Latin America, CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) provides a forum for regional coordination. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Mercosur (the Southern Common Market) and the African Continental Free Trade Area pursue economic integration across their respective continents.
Their common significance lies in the diversification of the institutional landscape. Developing countries now have additional channels through which to mobilize resources, coordinate positions and participate in international affairs. This gives governments more options in negotiating economic relationships and provides additional forums in which their priorities can be articulated.
Such diversification does not automatically guarantee development. To understand the significance of these arrangements, what they enable countries to achieve must be examined. Three principal mechanisms can be identified.
The first is investment and connectivity. Developing economies often face significant constraints in financing infrastructure. Transport networks, energy systems, ports and digital connectivity can help address these constraints. Development banks can mobilize financing, while cooperation frameworks such as the Belt and Road Initiative can support cross-border infrastructure. However, infrastructure is a means, not an end. A railway or port may reduce transport costs, but its broader development impact depends on whether it connects domestic producers to markets, supports industrial activity and employment, and can be maintained over time. Domestic governments need the capabilities to guide these improvements.
The second mechanism is productive transformation. Development also involves changes in what economies produce, the technologies they use and the value they create. Regional integration can enlarge markets and create opportunities for production networks. Yet the existence of a regional market does not automatically produce industrial upgrading. Countries need productive capabilities, skilled workers, competitive companies and policies that allow domestic enterprises to benefit from new opportunities. The crucial question is whether cooperation helps countries diversify their economies, move into higher-value activities and build capabilities that endure beyond individual projects or fluctuations in commodity prices.
The third mechanism is greater policy capacity and collective agency. Development strategies are shaped not only by the availability of resources, but also by the ability of governments to determine priorities, negotiate investment conditions and coordinate economic policies. Alternative financing channels and regional cooperation can broaden the options available to developing countries. The objective is to expand the capacity of countries to make choices, negotiate external relationships and develop their own productive capabilities.
To conclude, the emergence of new multilateral institutions reflects the changing position of the Global South. Reforming established institutions and developing additional forms of cooperation are complementary processes. A more representative international system requires greater opportunities for developing countries to participate in decision-making, while maintaining respect for international law and the obligations that states have accepted. It would also require institutions that help countries mobilize resources, strengthen productive capabilities and pursue sustainable development.
The significance of new multilateral institutions lies in the possibilities they create. A more pluralistic international order should be understood not simply as an order with more institutions, but as one in which developing countries have a greater capacity to shape their own development and participate meaningfully in the governance of the shared international system.
The author is a professor at the Belt and Road School at Beijing Normal University Zhuhai Campus.
The author contributed this article to China Watch, a think tank powered by China Daily. The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.
Contact the editor at editor@chinawatch.cn.
