Japanese media propaganda served its wartime aggression

Ninety-five years ago, Japan orchestrated the September 18th Incident, marking the beginning of its invasion of Northeast China. From that point, Japan's media aligned with its war agenda. As Japan set its expansionist sights on North China, the domestic media supported the military's efforts to extend influence and privileges. However, Japan's military was caught off guard by the swift formation of a united Chinese front following the Xi'an Incident in late 1936, disrupting its plans for a "North China separation" strategy.

The outbreak of a full-scale war of aggression against China after the July 7th Incident in 1937 fueled anti-Japanese sentiment among the Chinese people. In response, the Japanese government intensified its news censorship and propaganda efforts.

Catering to wartime demands, the Japanese media actively reported the fall of key cities such as Nanjing, Xuzhou, Wuhan and Guangzhou to rally public support for the war effort.

News reports focused on incidents such as "attacks on Japanese nationals" in China, compilation of anti-aggression textbooks by the Chinese and "anti-Japanese movements" led by the Communist Party of China and students.

These narratives were crafted to justify Japan's so-called "chastisement" of China. This propaganda-driven environment gradually mobilized all of Japanese society for the war effort.

Consequently, Japanese perception of China regressed to outdated stereotypes of a "stagnant" and "crude" nation.

The following year, the Fumimaro Konoe cabinet issued three statements aimed at beguiling the public with the idea of economic integration with China while attempting to undermine the Chinese people's resolve to resist.

As the expansionist faction within the Japanese military gained influence, support grew for the so-called concept of "Japan-Manchuria-China" economic integration. The war was framed as a "holy war", justifying the expansion of the battlefront. This protracted the war, leaving the situation deadlocked.

By the end of 1941, the war had spread to the Pacific, reaching a critical stage in China. However, most Japanese media reports, in the name of "supporting the Emperor's efforts" and "pacification", falsely depicted the occupied regions as stable and orderly "peaceful areas", a stark contrast to their earlier portrayal as violent and crude.

Japan treated the so-called "Manchuria-Mongolia" as an independent region severed from China, calling it a "friendly place" and a "paradise of the kingly way". Japanese media use derogatory terms such as "violent", "arrogant", "root of evil" and "deluded" to describe its "enemies".

At the same time, flattering language was used for interest groups cooperating with Japan, emphasizing "goodwill", "cooperation", "harmony", "mutual benefit", "coexistence" and "shared prosperity".

Despite the full-scale war with China, the Japanese media painted a contradictory picture of public opinion.

It suggested that eliminating a few "rioters" would restore good-neighborly friendship between China and Japan, and the occupied areas could achieve the utopian ideals of a "paradise of the kingly way" and "harmony among different ethnic groups". The huge gap between reality and propaganda rendered public opinion of the time both illusory and unrealistic, intertwining opposing narratives of hostility and friendship toward China.

After Japan's defeat in the war of aggression, most people felt only a weak sense of being defeated by China.

This was partly because the overwhelming military power of the United States, including the bombings of the Japanese homeland, the Battle of Okinawa, and the two atomic bombs, had left the public deeply traumatized. Amid the pain of losing relatives and property, a "sense of victimhood" outweighed any awareness of being the aggressor.

For government leaders and senior military officials, the primary concern in accepting the Potsdam Declaration and unconditional surrender was the preservation of the "Kokutai", or the emperor system.

After assurances from the US that the emperor system would be retained, Japan agreed to unconditional surrender.

Emperor Hirohito then personally issued the imperial rescript on the "termination of the war", leading the Japanese people to believe that this referred specifically to the end of the Pacific War against the United Kingdom and the US.

This allowed Japan to continue rationalizing the war of aggression against China as an effort to "stabilize East Asia" and "liberate Asia", without any deep reflection or reckoning of its militarist actions.

In postwar Japan, society began addressing war responsibility, with criticism largely aimed at the military and political leaders who had instigated the war and mobilized the public.

However, Japanese society as a whole still exhibits a limited recognition of the suffering caused to the people of Asia, particularly the Chinese, by the war of aggression and Japan's role as an aggressor and colonizer.

After the war, Japan's primary task was to achieve national independence while fostering peaceful and cooperative relations with its neighbors.

Addressing its war responsibility toward China and normalizing diplomatic ties are unavoidable issues in this effort. This history is still relevant in Japanese society today.

The author is an associate professor at the Beijing Foreign Studies University and former editor-in-chief of Iwanami Shoten, a major academic publishing house in Japan.

The views don't necessarily reflect those of China Daily.

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