New Middle East security architecture a response to US pivot

In Mecca on Friday, leaders of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkiye signed an agreement on collective defense: "An armed attack against any one of the three States shall be regarded as an attack against them all". The agreement was heralded by some observers as a fundamental reshaping of the security architecture of the Middle East.

Is a new security agreement really needed by any of the Meccan signatories? Saudi Arabia has deepened its defense partnership with the United States through a Strategic Defense Agreement. Pakistan is recognized by the US as a Major Non-Nato Ally with priority access to US military technology and research. And Turkiye is a full member of NATO, protected by Article 5 of the NATO treaty.

It is true they all face individual security issues. Pakistan, although a nuclear power with a large and battle-hardened military, is faced on its eastern border by India, a nuclear power with a larger military and a more robust economic and industrial base. To Pakistan's northwest, the Taliban continues to pose security concerns. Iran, along Pakistan's western border, could conceivably become a competing nuclear power; or, alternatively, it may collapse, pouring refugees across the border, endangering security and the economy.

Turkiye has experienced domestic security issues with the Kurdistan Workers' Party, a Kurdish militant group. On its southern border, Turkiye faces Iraq and Syria, both with large Kurdish minorities. Iraq, largely Shia, has ties to Iran; and Syria continues to experience sectarian conflicts. Israel has repeatedly bombed Syrian sites and has made cross-border incursions. Leading Israeli politicians also recently named Turkiye as their nation's greatest threat.

Saudi Arabia is vulnerable to attacks on its oil industry by both Iran and Yemeni Houthis. In 2019, Iranian drones massively disrupted critical production at Abqaiq; in July 2026, multiple oil facilities were targeted; and, this past month, Saudi oil tankers in the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the southern Red Sea were struck from coastal Yemen.

But such individual security problems fail to explain the Mecca agreement. Far more fundamental is the accumulating security impact of aftershocks from the US pivot to Asia in 2011.

Pakistan's first shock from the pivot was the revival in 2017 of the Quad, an arrangement closely linking the US with India (also Japan and Australia). Pakistan then accelerated efforts to build ever closer ties with China; but that led to deepening tensions with Washington; and US security assistance to Pakistan declined sharply after 2019.

Turkiye, already angered after 2014 by US support of Kurdish forces in Iraq, believed the pivot meant the US would no longer confront Russia in Syria or the Black Sea. In 2017, Turkiye purchased Russia's S-400 defense system. This led to US sanctions, Turkiye's removal from the F-35program and a prolonged dispute over its F-16 fleet.

Saudi Arabia, quickly understanding the probable security and economic consequences of the pivot, committed in 2017 to developing its own industrial defense base. It also recognized Washington's interest in the region would be lessened by the US' growing energy independence and by isolationist tendencies in American politics (especially MAGA).

Riyadh sought to counter these factors, not only through the 2025 defense agreement with the US, but also by seeking to involve US business in its economic development and diversification programs. Nevertheless, drone attacks on Saudi Arabia's major oil facilities went unanswered by the US in 2019. This shock was quickly followed by another in 2020 when the US withdrew Patriot missile batteries protecting oil installations.

The full security implications of the US pivot away from the Middle East became clearly apparent in the brutal Palestine-Israel conflict and the US-Israeli conflict with Iran this year. Failure to restrain Israel's bombing campaign against Hamas raised doubts about the US' will to control Israel's aspirations for regional hegemony. Although many even in the US called for an end to the genocidal attacks, Washington seemed not to care.

How the US has conducted the conflict with Iran also raised many security concerns. Why did the US call a halt to hostilities so quickly and after so few casualties? Why did the US fail to force Iran to open the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf's lifeline? Why, after exposing the Gulf countries to attack, did the US want them to pay reparations to Iran? Why were there reports that the Pentagon was saving missiles that could have been used against Iran for more important uses? And why would the US president dangle an offer of nuclear cooperation in a broader security partnership — only to withdraw it and make it contingent on normalization of relations with Israel?

Such questions combine into a fundamental concern: Does the US, now focused on the Pacific, possess the will, commitment and capacity to guarantee security in the Middle East?

That is the issue that brought the leaders of the three nations to Mecca this past week. They recognize that their security environment has been permanently changed by an ongoing, perhaps accelerating decline of US interest in the region.

The author is former consul general of Egypt to the Hong Kong and Macao SARs and a political and business adviser on MENA-China relations.

The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.

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