Journey has just begun, destination still very far

US President Barack Obama's visit to China later this month is expected to bring the intensive high-level mutual visits of Chinese and American officials to a new high following positive steps since he came to power. To put it in proper perspective, Obama's "new deal" on China policy has three new factors.

First, thanks to its "new thinking", the Obama administration has come up with more new ideas on bilateral ties in eight months than the George W. Bush government could in its first four years. This new thinking is reflected in US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's assertion that the two countries are in the same boat in these troubled times and Obama's declaration that Sino-US ties are the "most important bilateral relations in world".

In his first major speech on China, Obama said Sino-US ties would shape the 21st century, dismissed fears of Beijing being a threat and rejected the policy of containing it. Instead, he said the two countries are going to become "partners". This is in sharp contrast to Bush, who called China a "strategic adversary" even before he had taken office.

And US Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg reflected the new thinking by using "strategic reassurance" to highlight America's readiness to accept China as a rising power and to strike a strategic deal with it.

Second, the Obama administration has come up with "new agenda" to expand Sino-American cooperation, infuse energy into bilateral ties and make it more dynamic. Clinton and other heavyweight US politicians have made climate change and new energy their priority, with some trying to make it a new strategic foundation for China-US cooperation.

Another issue emphasized by Obama's foreign policy team right from the beginning is the strengthening of Sino-US military relations to intensify mutual trust. Clinton has been pushing for the resumption of military-to-military dialogue, which was suspended because of US arms sale to Taiwan during Bush's last days in office. The participation of military personnel in the high-level Strategic and Economic Dialogue (SAED) for the first time was a good start in that direction. And it's more than obvious that Washington accords priority to Sino-US relations to resolve the world financial crisis.

Third, Obama's "new approach" is different from the Bush administration's initial "benign neglect" of China. Clinton made it a point to visit China during her first overseas trip as the secretary of state, and initiated the new consultation mechanism, SAED, which is unprecedented in its scope and level. Moreover, in sharp contrast to previous administrations, the Obama government does not emphasize sensitive issues such as human rights in its interaction with China and has shown more respect to its progress in that area.

On the surface, the new factors give Sino-US relations a positive look. Yet deep-rooted mutual strategic distrust remains strong, and conflict of interest in several areas is still salient. It is Obama who imposed punitive tariff on China-made tires and steel products, something that Bush had repeatedly refrained from doing. The US military and intelligence departments continue to see China as America's main strategic challenger and a threat to its interest. These are just a few examples that show bilateral ties may not be as rosy as they appear to be.

Among other things, Obama's "new thinking" is far from reaching the American military and intelligence establishments because they still see China's long-term goals with suspicion. In fact, they have been working on the worst-case scenario to hedge against China. There is no dearth of American elite and politicians who doubt that China will ever become a genuine strategic partner of the US. They still do not think China-US ties can be described as "strategic" because Washington cannot expect Beijing to wholeheartedly help it deal with some tough foreign policy issues such as Afghanistan, Iran, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

It would be fair to say that China has similar strategic suspicions when it comes to the US. The fact is, both are constrained by their domestic politics and hence, not in a position to make a policy choice easily. Obama made it clear right at the beginning that his presidency would be judged ultimately by his domestic performance, especially by whether he can turn the US economy around and implement his healthcare reform successfully.

His decision to impose high tariff on China-made tires at the risk of triggering a trade war was aimed at making US Congress, which is leaning toward protectionism, and labor unions happy in order to get their support for his domestic political agenda. For China, the political troubles in the Tibet and Xinjiang Uygur autonomous regions, and some other incidents have occasionally created unwanted friction with Washington.

Though it makes sound logic to expand the "new frontier" of Sino-US relations by introducing issues such as climate change and energy on the agenda, some wonder whether such issues could serve as a new strategic foundation for bilateral cooperation. Is there a domestic consensus on these issues in both countries? Could China and the US reach a true understanding on these transnational issues? Will cooperation on these issues generate enough spillover effect to overshadow old disputes?

Answers to all these questions are not certain, to say the least. We have to wait and see if Obama and President Hu Jintao can reach a substantial agreement on climate change.

The key factor for bilateral ties entering a historical stage is whether the two countries can address the so-called "core concerns and interests" of each other. Steinberg's idea of "strategic reassurance" is no doubt good, but "reassurance" has to be mutual rather than one-sided. Describing it as a "bargain" point, he asserts that the US is ready to accept "a prosperous and successful power". Though China welcomes such a gesture, it won't consider it as genuine if Washington is unable to make "meaningful" policy adjustments on a number of China's core national interests, including Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan as Hu repeatedly has urged Obama to do.

But evidence on this front has not been overwhelming. While Obama took a wise step by postponing his meeting with the Dalai Lama until after his visit to China, it remains a sour issue in Sino-US ties. Besides, there are enough signs that the US is gearing up to sell more arms to Taiwan, which will deal another blow to bilateral relations.

The Obama administration took a bold decision in changing America's policy of building a missile-defense shield in Europe to meet Russia's core national interest. Will we see it taking a similar step in its China policy?

Since Obama entered the Oval Office, China and the US have said many good things and made many friendly gestures, which were important and necessary. But the more difficult part, as both sides realize, is how to "turn words into action". The two countries still have a long way to go in this regard. That's why it would be premature to declare, as some Chinese scholars have hastily done, that Sino-US ties have entered a phase of long-term stability, and structural contradictions will no longer carry the day.

The author is professor of international relations in the University of Macao.

(China Daily 11/04/2009 page9)