A late invitation, a regional cost: How Teodoro's agenda weakens the ADMM-Plus

Beijing's warning against "hijacking ASEAN" on Oct 26 drew attention to the Philippine defense leadership's handling of China's participation in the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus). On Oct 14, Philippine public broadcaster Radyo Pilipinas reported that Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. considered inviting China difficult under the circumstances, while suggesting that other forms of participation might be possible.

On Oct 23, Teodoro said China had been sent notice only the previous day — seven days before the ministerial meeting. People familiar with ADMM-Plus procedures and practices describe notice this close to a ministerial meeting as highly unusual, and a "notice" obviously doesn't carry the courtesy and respect befitting such a diplomatic occasion the way an "invitation" does.

On Oct 27, China announced that its defense attaché at the Chinese Embassy in the Philippines would represent China at the 13th ADMM-Plus in Manila. At a forum designed to bring defense ministers together, the handling of China's participation fell short of diplomatic courtesy and put the chair's procedural authority behind Teodoro's personal grudge towards China.

That approach has been visible throughout Teodoro's tenure. Shortly after taking office in 2023, he suspended the Philippines' direct military-to-military communication with China, which runs counter to the consensus reached by the two countries' leaders and foreign ministries. As he constantly attacked China with his "China threat" narrative, distorted the history and legal basis regarding the South China Sea issue, and smeared practical cooperation between the two countries, he was sanctioned by China in June 2026.

After that, Teodoro became even more hysterical and unscrupulous in stigmatizing China on various domestic and international occasions, and tried to drag other countries into his vendetta against China.

In September, the Philippines and Japan co-chaired the ADMM-Plus EWG on Maritime Security Joint Cooperative Activity — a joint maritime exercise in the disputed waters near Huangyan Island — and only two other ASEAN countries sent ships for the exercise.

Taken together, these actions bear clear signs of political calculation: keep defense dialogue with Beijing at arm's length, bring security partners into his maritime agenda, pull political stunts to seek media attention, and cultivate a hawkish anti-China image to serve his personal political ambitions. The late notice carried that approach into a forum whose chair is entrusted to serve all participants.

The ADMM-Plus draws its legitimacy from collective stewardship. Its founding Modalities and Procedures designate the ADMM as the forum's driving force, make consultation and consensus the basis for ADMM-Plus decisions, and call for arrangements that facilitate the attendance of Plus countries.

A chair that lets its own political agenda govern participation arrangements erodes that foundation. It makes normal access of established members dependent on the rotating host's preferences and sets a dangerous precedent for future chairs. Over time, the ADMM-Plus risks losing what makes it valuable — being a dependable platform for countries with disagreements and disputes to meet and talk.

The immediate loss is felt in the meeting. ADMM-Plus gives defense ministers a forum to hear one another's security assessments directly, examine disagreements, and set the direction for practical cooperation. A defense attaché can convey China's position and maintain working contacts, but cannot engage other ministers with comparable political authority.

The Philippine side's manipulation of the meeting denies the opportunity for other parties to engage with senior Chinese delegates, including a possible China-US defense ministerial meeting. Those exchanges are especially valuable when a regional situation faces increasing risks and uncertainties.

For ASEAN, the cost is its credibility as a convener. ADMM and ADMM-Plus documents have repeatedly affirmed an open and inclusive forum with ASEAN at its center. RSIS researcher Henrick Tsjeng observed in 2025 that geopolitical fault lines already run through the ADMM-Plus and that ASEAN chairs need to manage them carefully. Teodoro's handling of the ADMM-Plus chairmanship adds to such pressures. Other ASEAN members bear the reputational cost of the defense leadership's choices, while confidence in ASEAN's ability to bring competing powers together is under question.

The Philippine government also has reasons to weigh the wider consequences. Its presidential office said in October that it remained committed to diplomatic and economic engagement with China while upholding Philippine interests. A defense leadership decision that diminishes a regional dialogue channel complicates that broader approach and may narrow Manila's room to manage future incidents. The strategic risk is that a confrontation driven by the defense leadership begins to shape the Philippines' relationship with China as a whole.

At a time when wars and crises strain the international system, reliable defense dialogue is a strategic asset. The ADMM-Plus brings ASEAN ministers and major powers into regular contact and sets a basis for their military forces to work together.

September's Trident Resolve exercise in Indonesia — bringing together all 19 ADMM-Plus participants, including China — set an example for that practical cooperation, which focused on such common concerns as disaster-relief, medical-response, and cyber-security.

A precedent that makes ministerial participation subject to one defense leader's political agenda weakens the confidence behind such cooperation. In a region central to global security, the consequences extend well beyond a meeting.

Ultimately, China's decision to participate maintains an open channel that the region needs. ASEAN members have a common interest in preventing this ugly episode from repeating itself and in preserving the legitimate rights of all.

A shared forum is most valuable when it sustains the conversations that political tensions make the hardest to hold.

The author is a Chinese scholar.

The views don't necessarily reflect those of China Daily.

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