US incitement of Philippines hurts regional peace
In the early hours of October 20, the US Navy's littoral combat ship USS Charleston entered the waters adjacent to Xianbin Reef in China's Nansha Islands without the authorization of the Chinese government. The Southern Theater Command of the People's Liberation Army promptly organized forces to track, monitor, warn, and expel the vessel in accordance with law and regulations. The Theater Command's naval spokesperson stated clearly that the US action violated China's sovereignty and rights, endangered maritime safety, and was not conducive to regional peace and stability.
Xianbin Reef is an integral part of China's Nansha Islands. China's territorial sovereignty over the reef is indisputable. An unauthorized military intrusion into its adjacent waters constitutes a deliberate challenge to that sovereignty. The choice of location was not random. Xianbin Reef lies immediately east of Ren'ai Reef, where the Philippines has maintained a grounded warship since 1999. In recent years, Manila has sought to treat Xianbin as a forward staging point or intermediate node for resupply operations to that vessel. Efforts to manufacture an "environmental" narrative around Xianbin and to station coast guard vessels inside its lagoon have pursued the same objective. These attempts have been thwarted by Chinese countermeasures, yet they have succeeded in drawing external attention to the reef. The timing of the US warship's appearance therefore serves dual purposes: a visible demonstration of presence intended to reassure a junior partner, and a carefully bounded signal that avoids the risks of a more provocative platform or daylight confrontation.
The vessel selected and the manner of its transit further reveal priorities. A littoral combat ship operating under cover of darkness and exiting rapidly reflects a calculation in which risk management outweighs deterrent effect. One of the stated aims of US "freedom of navigation" operations in the South China Sea has been to contest the legal status of certain features, including the assertion that Xianbin Reef generates no territorial sea. The present transit is consistent with that long-standing objective.
The broader "freedom of navigation" framing, however, remains a false proposition. Roughly half of global merchant shipping and one-third of maritime trade transit the South China Sea. Commercial navigation has continued without obstruction despite the complexity of competing claims. What US warships actually contest, under the banner of freedom of navigation, are China's routine maritime rights-protection, law-enforcement, and presence activities within waters under its jurisdiction. The operational pattern is better understood as freedom of military maneuver for the United States itself—an assertion of maritime primacy rather than a defense of open commercial sea lanes. In this sense, the United States functions as a principal source of instability rather than a guardian of order.
Against the backdrop of efforts by China and the United States to build a constructive strategic stable relationship, Washington needs to exercise greater restraint over its frontline forces. Unchecked operations of this kind raise the risk of maritime accidents and miscalculations between the two sides. Such incidents could rapidly escalate into a larger crisis, undermining the strategic stability both countries have an interest in sustaining. Managing frontline behavior is therefore not a secondary tactical issue but a necessary condition for preventing unintended confrontation at the operational level.
The subsequent reactions from Washington and Manila have formed a coordinated sequence: an intrusion followed by endorsement. The United States rehearsed its familiar freedom-of-navigation language; the Philippines added the claim that the warship had not entered Chinese territory. Presented as the fulfillment of security commitments and the defense of a rules-based order, these synchronized statements function as a staged performance. Their primary audience is not China but other US allies and partners in the "Indo-Pacific". The episode operates as a mobile advertisement of alliance credibility, intended to demonstrate that bilateral and minilateral military cooperation continues and that the United States will not reduce its regional military and diplomatic investment amid its own strategic adjustments.
Within the Philippines, elements of the military and law-enforcement apparatus have increasingly acted as drivers of confrontation. Hardline voices inside the navy, coast guard, and related security agencies have treated successive US moves in the South China Sea as leverage for domestic political gain and as instruments of pressure on China. These tendencies enjoy both external encouragement from Washington and tacit tolerance from the Marcos administration. The result has been a progressive subordination of Manila's South China Sea and China policies to the institutional interests of the security establishment. Resources that could address pressing domestic economic and social needs are diverted toward expanded military postures whose utility against a major power remains limited. The cumulative effect is the steady erosion of the practical foundations of China–Philippines relations.
Manila should note the limits of external sponsorship. Major powers outside the region pursue their own global calculations. They are prepared to supply materiel, conduct joint patrols, and issue supportive statements; they are not prepared to absorb the direct costs of a crisis that Manila itself initiates. Should an incident escalate beyond the controlled parameters of the present nighttime transit, external partners retain the option of disengagement. The residual political, economic, and security burdens would fall on the Philippines alone. Treating the presence of a littoral combat ship as evidence of reliable backing, rather than as a calibrated signal of limited risk tolerance, constitutes a serious misreading of both US intentions and regional dynamics.
China's sovereignty over the Nansha Islands and their adjacent waters is clear. Theater Command forces remain on high alert. Any calculation that external backing can be converted into tangible gains at China's expense is a misjudgment of the situation. Infringements on China's sovereign rights will meet firm countermeasures. The early morning passage of the Charleston does not demonstrate the reliability of external support; it illustrates the priority external actors assign to managing their own exposure. Manila would be better served by recognizing that distinction.
The author is the director of the Center for International and Regional Studies, National Institute for South China Sea Studies.
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