Egypt a key partner in BRI cooperation

President Xi Jinping's visit to Egypt marks a pivotal moment in Sino-Egyptian relations. This is his first state visit to the country in 10 years and coincides with the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Cairo and Beijing.

The visit heralds a new phase in a relationship that has evolved into a comprehensive strategic partnership spanning the economy, infrastructure, technology, politics, security and international affairs.

Over the past decade, China-Egypt ties have steadily deepened, with China emerging as one of Egypt's leading trading partners, investors and sources of manufacturing capacity. The China-Egypt TEDA Suez Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone stands as a model of industrial cooperation, hosting hundreds of Chinese companies and creating thousands of jobs.

More importantly, the nature of these investments has changed from merely serving the Egyptian market to establishing a production base aimed at exports to the Middle East, Africa and Europe.

In turn, Egypt has emerged as a key node within the Belt and Road Initiative. Its strategic location, the Suez Canal, ports, the Suez Canal Economic Zone and extensive network of trade agreements with Arab, African and European markets position it as a potential regional industrial and logistics hub.

If Cairo and Beijing succeed in deepening manufacturing ties and in transferring and localizing technology, Egypt could transform into a Chinese production platform for the Middle East and Africa. Meanwhile, the Suez Canal could evolve from merely a global trade route into an integrated center for industry, logistics services and supply chains. The growing Chinese investments in the economic zone confirm that this trend has already begun.

In the military and security domains, Egypt, like other medium and major powers in the Middle East, seeks to diversify its sources of military equipment and technology.

The military cooperation between Egypt and the United States remains strategic and Washington continues to be a major partner for Cairo.

However, the US' restrictions on certain sensitive capabilities and technologies, coupled with what is perceived in Egypt as a US reluctance to provide capabilities that could alter regional balances of power, particularly vis-à-vis Israel, are gradually pushing Cairo toward exploring alternative sources.

But the shift by Egypt and other regional countries toward China, Russia, the Republic of Korea, France and others should not be seen as a move against the US or a desire for confrontation with Washington. Rather, it is a pragmatic policy based on a very simple principle: if one source does not provide the required capabilities and technologies, alternatives will be sought from other capable partners.

This shift toward multiple partners is difficult to reverse, not because Cairo wants to abandon Washington, but because it no longer accepts that a strategic relationship with the US should mean exclusive dependence on it, particularly in areas directly linked to national security and strategic independence.

Also, Egypt may not rely primarily on the US for artificial intelligence technologies, particularly those related to security, military applications and vital government sectors, given the sensitivity of these areas and their direct connection to national security and sovereignty over data and digital infrastructure. The US-Israeli war against Iran has provided important lessons in this regard.

China may be better suited to Egypt as a major partner in establishing and developing AI infrastructure, including data centers, computing capabilities, networks and cloud computing.

This is particularly relevant given the growing China-Egypt cooperation in the digital economy and AI, and Beijing's efforts to provide integrated solutions to developing countries in this field.

This does not, of course, mean excluding US or Western companies from the Egyptian market. Cairo is likely to continue cooperating with US companies, but it would avoid strategic dependence on US technology in sensitive areas.

Accordingly, an Egyptian model could emerge based on diversifying technology sources, giving China a greater role in core infrastructure while benefiting at the same time from US expertise. This is consistent with Cairo's broader policy of maintaining strategic autonomy between Washington and Beijing.

On the international stage, Cairo and Beijing share several fundamental principles, particularly regarding the Palestinian question and other regional conflicts. China's position has been clear and consistent for decades: respect for all international decisions and resolutions related to the Palestinian question. Its position during Israel's war on Gaza was also strong, rejecting the war and opposing plans to forcibly displace Palestinians, while maintaining its commitment to the two-state solution and the establishment of a Palestinian state as a key to regional and international stability.

It is no secret that China's position on the Middle East crises has strengthened its image among broad segments of Arab public opinion, especially in Egypt. At the same time, the image of the US has deteriorated significantly because of its role in the war and its alignment with Israel.

Xi's visit to Egypt, following more than a decade of constructive strategic cooperation across various sectors, is a major opportunity to develop and deepen cooperation in the future.

This strategic partnership serves the interests of the Middle East, Africa and the Global South as a whole.

The author is the head of the Media and Public Opinion Studies Unit at the Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies.

The views don't necessarily reflect those of China Daily.

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