China-Indonesia 2+2 defines strategic autonomy

The Second Ministerial Meeting of China-Indonesia Joint Foreign and Defense Ministerial Dialogue (the 2+2 mechanism) in Jakarta last Friday marks an important change in bilateral ties.

The latest meeting suggests that this balance is shifting as political and defense cooperation becomes more institutionalized, giving Indonesia a chance to make strategic autonomy practical.

That opportunity should not be confused with alignment. What matters is whether they expand Indonesia's capacity to make independent choices. Strategic autonomy is not demonstrated by having many partners. It is demonstrated by having enough capability and leverage to prevent any one partner from determining Indonesia's options.

The 2+2 mechanism matters because it pushes Indonesia-China relations beyond episodic diplomacy. Beijing is attaching particular importance to the mechanism as it is its first ministerial-level 2+2 arrangement with another country. For Indonesia, the value lies in whether regular dialogue produces capabilities that Jakarta was struggling to build.

Defense cooperation offers the clearest test. Indonesian officials have discussed cooperation with China in ammunition production, missiles, rockets, and technology transfer. These areas matter for a country seeking to modernize its armed forces and reduce reliance on any single supplier.

China brings capabilities that few partners can match. Its manufacturing base, expanding defense industry, technological capacity, infrastructure experience, and ability to mobilize capital provide Indonesia with resources to support its modernization.

Buying from more countries is diversification. Being able to operate, maintain, adapt, and eventually produce critical technologies is a form of autonomy. A diversified procurement portfolio may provide flexibility, but it can also create costly fragmentation.

Cooperation with China will have greater value if it helps Indonesian engineers acquire knowledge, strengthens domestic production, and enables local firms to move beyond low-value assembly. That is the difference between suppliers and capability.

Indonesia's challenge is straightforward. External partnerships create opportunities, but domestic institutions still have to convert them into national capability. Clear priorities, better implementation, and technological absorption matter more than diplomatic announcements.

Strategic autonomy is ultimately domestic before it is diplomatic.

More partnerships can generate more activity without producing more leverage. The contribution of the 2+2 mechanism will depend on whether Indonesia uses it to build domestic capabilities while expanding cooperation abroad.

Maritime cooperation provides another test. Indonesia and China do not approach every maritime issue from the same position, and a serious partnership should not require them to do so. Different interests and legal interpretations will remain. The question is whether both governments can manage those differences while protecting cooperation. Regular dialogue can reduce misperceptions, clarify sensitivities, and address problems before they become political crises.

If maritime cooperation expands into sensitive areas or joint development arrangements there will be greater clarity. Diplomatic flexibility can help governments manage difficult questions, but implementation works best when legal and operational boundaries are understood by both sides. Indonesia should not assume that broad political language will automatically translate into workable arrangements. China also has an interest in ensuring that cooperation is viewed in Indonesia as expanding national capability and policy space.

The consequences extend beyond bilateral ties. Indonesia and China are central to Southeast Asia's political and economic architecture, while developments in the South China Sea continue to affect regional confidence. More predictable communication between Jakarta and Beijing can reduce the risk of bilateral frictions leading to greater instability.

Practical cooperation on maritime security, cyber threats, transnational crime, and crisis management can also strengthen regional resilience when both sides maintain credible communication channels.

This regional dimension gives the 2+2 mechanism significance beyond another bilateral forum. Indonesia is ASEAN's largest country, while China is the region's largest trading partner and a major security actor. Better communication cannot resolve every regional dispute, but it can lower the risk of miscalculation and make cooperation more routine. That is a concrete contribution to regional peace and security.

Jakarta's deeper cooperation with China should not be interpreted as a decision to choose Beijing over other major powers. An autonomous Indonesia will cooperate with China where interests converge, seek alternatives where useful, and reject pressure from any partner when national interests diverge.

A stronger Indonesia may, in fact, be a more durable partner for China. Dependence can create short-term convenience, but it also produces political vulnerability and domestic resistance. Cooperation built on greater Indonesian capacity is likely to be more stable because Jakarta can defend the relationship as a strategic choice rather than a necessity.

China, likewise, benefits from dealing with a partner capable of implementing agreements, sustaining projects, and managing domestic concerns around sovereignty and national control.

A durable Indonesia-China partnership does not require Indonesia to become less autonomous. It should do the opposite. More meetings, mechanisms, agreements, and strategic labels can create the appearance of influence without changing what Indonesia is actually able to do. The 2+2 dialogue should be judged over time by its effect on defense capability, industrial capacity, maritime coordination, crisis management, and both sides' ability to manage disagreement.

If the 2+2 mechanism helps Indonesia build capabilities it can sustain, gives China a more capable and predictable partner, and allows both countries to manage differences without sacrificing cooperation, the relationship will gain something more valuable than diplomatic symbolism.

It will gain resilience, making mutual benefit more durable while contributing to a more stable regional order.

The author is the executive director of PARA Syndicate, a Jakarta-based independent think tank.

The views don't necessarily reflect those of China Daily.

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