Latin America knows who is cooperative, who exploitative

Apparently, in the eyes of some United States politicians, the latest threat to Latin America is not invasion, inflation or being treated like Washington's backyard. It is a Huawei router.

Juan Pablo Segura, the US assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs, who oversees US foreign policy and relations across Latin America, the Caribbean and Canada, has issued a warning worthy of a Cold War spy thriller: Huawei, ZTE, Hytera, Hikvision, Dahua and DJI are "high-risk technologies" because Chinese law supposedly "forces" them to "spy, hack and shut down" networks.

The message to Latin America is essentially: Trust us. We know what surveillance looks like.

China's Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian called the baseless accusations fact-distorting fabrications and blatant techno-bullying. And Beijing's diplomatic mission in Panama accused Washington of acting like a thief crying "Stop thief".

The US' unwarranted alarm bell rings hollow because Washington has a credibility problem. The US has a long record of electronic surveillance, tapping and cyber operations, including across Latin America and the Caribbean. So when Washington suddenly becomes the hemisphere's anxious aunt warning everyone about "Chinese spyware", Latin Americans have a reasonable question: Who exactly is listening to whom?

And, why should Panama, Brazil, Peru or any other Latin American country be told which telecommunications equipment, drones or cameras it may buy?

Washington's answer is "national security". But that phrase is becoming remarkably elastic. It now seems capable of covering everything from semiconductors and ports to lithium, telecommunications and, apparently, even siu mai, Chinese steamed dumplings.

There is a more uncomfortable explanation: China is gaining influence because it is offering things Latin America actually wants. It is building ports, railways, factories and digital infrastructure. The Chancay Port in Peru has shortened shipping times between South America and Asia dramatically. Chinese companies are localizing production of electric vehicles and cooperating on telecommunications, renewable energy and advanced manufacturing projects.

Washington wants Latin America to provide oil and critical minerals for US supply chains and to exclude Chinese companies. The US' trade initiatives come with geopolitical conditions. Its immigration policies have alienated millions of Latin Americans. And the US' maneuvering in the Panama Canal has revived fears that Washington still regards the hemisphere less as a community of sovereign states and more as a US preserve.

That is the problem with the "Donroe Doctrine" as it is known. The old Monroe Doctrine said, in effect, that outsiders should stay out of the US' neighborhood. The new version seems to say something more alarming: Latin Americans themselves should be careful about whom they invite into their neighborhood.

The seizure of control over the Balboa and Cristobal ports after pressure to push out CK Hutchison should be a caution to the region. If a company can operate legally for decades and then discovers that geopolitics has suddenly rewritten the contract, every investor should ask what "sovereignty" means when Washington disapproves of the business partner.

China does not want Latin America to become a zero-sum game arena. If US companies want to win local contracts, they should compete by offering better projects, better financing, better technology and better partnerships — instead of relying on Washington's coercion to dictate whom Latin Americans are permitted to work with.

If Washington keeps shouting "Chinese spy" every time Latin America buys a camera, a drone or a telecom system, it may eventually become just background noise.

Latin American countries have witnessed and taken full note of everything the US has done to Panama, Cuba and Venezuela. And they have noticed who is offering projects — and who is offering threats.