Securitizing shipbuilding: How US protectionism wears a security disguise

Recently, the Stimson Center submitted specialized testimony to a US congressional hearing that reframed the market-driven achievements of China's shipbuilding industry as a "dual threat" to both economic security and national security.

The testimony explicitly called for closer coordination among the United States, Japan and South Korea to counter China's industrial advantages.

In doing so, it elevates ordinary commercial competition into the arena of great-power strategic rivalry, searching for fresh leverage to apply sustained pressure on China. This approach marks a significant departure from established norms of international trade, where market success is increasingly treated as a presumptive security liability rather than a reflection of genuine competitiveness.

The testimony itself concedes that China has completed the leap from "catcher-up" to global "leader." Its strengths, it acknowledges, lie not merely in sheer scale but in command over the full industrial chain — from raw materials and key components to advanced manufacturing processes and system integration — a structural outcome rooted in market competitiveness rather than short-term distortions or state-sponsored manipulation.

By documenting the evolution of the global industry landscape and confirming China's dominant position, the testimony inadvertently validates the commercial foundations of that success. Having laid this empirical groundwork, it then pivots sharply to a risk-oriented narrative, directly linking shipbuilding to economic and national security concerns.

Similar arguments have surfaced in earlier work by institutions such as the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the US Congressional Research Service. What distinguishes the latest testimony is its more systematic data, disciplined official language and concrete policy prescriptions, which together systematize and operationalize the dual-risk framework — effectively laying the intellectual foundation for additional restrictive measures against Chinese shipbuilders and their global partners.

Beyond the economic-security dimension, the testimony weaves an explicit "economy-security" linkage by stretching deep into national security territory. It highlights the parallel construction of commercial vessels and naval ships at many large Chinese yards, along with shared infrastructure, labor and technology. While acknowledging the technical differences between commercial and military shipbuilding, it frames these dual-use characteristics as a security threat, alleging they could substantially enhance the Chinese navy's capacity for the scaled delivery of logistics, auxiliary and support vessels.

This line of argument is highly problematic. The so-called dual-use nature of industrial infrastructure is neither unique to China nor inherently threatening. Major shipbuilders in South Korea, Japan and, historically, the United States have all managed parallel commercial and naval construction without being labeled systemic security risks. By singling out China, the testimony applies a selective and overreaching security lens. It transforms routine industrial synergies into a contrived geopolitical danger, stretching the concept of national security far beyond any reasonable bounds and setting a dangerous precedent for international trade governance.

At the same time, the testimony does not shy away from the USA's own structural vulnerabilities. It candidly identifies high labor attrition, fragile supply chains and insufficient market demand as core bottlenecks constraining any revival of US commercial shipbuilding.

From this diagnosis emerges a dual-track response. On the domestic track, it calls for legislation to bolster commercial shipbuilding, the creation of a dedicated US-flag commercial fleet program with clear volume targets, expanded adoption of commercial practices by the Department of Defense and the Navy, and sustained funding for maritime research and workforce development. These proposals are ambitious but face steep fiscal, legislative and practical obstacles, and even if implemented, they would require years to materially alter the competitive landscape.

On the international track, it urges transforming existing bilateral frameworks with Japan and South Korea from political commitments into binding legal instruments, preferably tied to concrete demand signals, to jointly address those three bottlenecks. Bilateral mechanisms with Japan and South Korea are already advancing at different speeds, though no formal trilateral legal arrangement yet exists. Their shared objective remains unmistakable: to offset China's leading position by reshaping global shipbuilding capacity through allied networks, effectively seeking to engineer a realignment of industrial supply chains along geopolitical lines.

These developments introduce new external variables into the competitive environment facing China's shipbuilding industry. Constrained by multiple structural bottlenecks, the proposed measures are unlikely to inflict material short-term damage on China's core advantages — complete industrial chains, cost control and economies of scale — which continue to underpin resilient order books and market share.

The deep integration of China's shipbuilding ecosystem, from steel production and advanced welding to modular construction and just-in-time logistics, creates efficiency barriers that cannot be quickly replicated by any competitor. Any substantive effects would more likely emerge over the medium to long term and in higher-value segments.

Should US-Japan-South Korea cooperation succeed in generating localized effective supply in auxiliary vessels, LNG carriers, specialized ships or repair services, it could gradually divert a portion of high-end demand. That would, in turn, require Chinese yards to strike a finer balance between maintaining scale and improving efficiency, while accelerating their own transition toward green vessels, smart ship technologies and higher-value engineering services.

More consequential than any incremental market shift, however, is the reinforced securitization narrative itself. It amplifies compliance and review risks across the entire maritime supply chain, potentially prompting the United States and its partners to intensify scrutiny of dual-use activities through expanded export-control lists, yard-access standards, technical certifications, port service restrictions and conditional financial support.

Such measures create a chilling effect where routine commercial transactions and technology cooperation could be subjected to heightened political screening, disrupting supply chains, increasing costs for global shipping operators and fragmenting the international maritime industry into competing blocs. This strategy layers asymmetric strategic pressure across the interconnected domains of industrial competition, regulatory compliance and international rule-making, gradually shifting the terms of engagement from market competition toward a governance model shaped by geopolitical alignment.

China has consistently and firmly opposed the US practice of over-generalizing the concept of national security to suppress Chinese enterprises. Market outcomes reflect genuine competitiveness, not fabricated threats. Protectionist measures — whether dressed as industrial policy or security imperatives — cannot restore US competitiveness. They distort markets, raise costs for global shipping and undermine the rules-based international economic order.

History demonstrates that industries shielded by walls do not become stronger; they only perpetuate inefficiency. Sustainable industrial revitalization requires open competition, investment in productivity, genuine technological upgrading and long-term commitment to workforce development, not the containment of others' legitimate development.

The path forward lies in fair competition and mutual benefit, not in elevating commercial success into a pretext for confrontation.

The author is the director of the Center for International and Regional Studies, National Institute for South China Sea Studies.

The views don't necessarily reflect those of China Daily.

If you have a specific expertise, or would like to share your thought about our stories, then send us your writings at opinion@chinadaily.com.cn, and comment@chinadaily.com.cn.