Ideology over pragmatism does EU a grave misservice

The greatest misunderstanding of Italian and European Union foreign policy in recent years has been treating NATO not only as a military alliance, but as the de facto limit of our trade policy with the rest of the world. This error stems from an improper and expansive use of the concept of "allies". The Atlantic Alliance has a precise, limited meaning: Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty provides for mutual defence in the event of armed aggression against one of the members. Nothing more. It does not dictate economic preferences, trade routes or market access. Confusing collective defence with economic subordination is a profound distortion of both international law and common sense.

Outside that narrow perimeter of collective security, countries have no permanent allies — only interests, partners, competitors, customers and suppliers. Yet in Italy and much of the EU, the notion has taken hold that being a "good Atlanticist" requires automatically aligning trade policy with Washington's orientation and forgoing opportunities with the Global South, BRICS nations and BRI countries. This is a dangerous mindset that neither international law nor the realist tradition can justify. Political thinkers from Machiavelli to Kissinger have taught that states act according to calculated national interests, not sentimental loyalty.

Personal friendships between leaders can certainly help. While serving my country as undersecretary of state for trade, I built cordial relationships with many governments around the world. But those relationships were never an end in themselves — they were a means to create better economic and social opportunities for Italian citizens.

The United States itself never speaks of a "Europeanist" policy. Washington speaks plainly of US national interest. When interests coincide, it cooperates; when they diverge, it pursues its own without apology. One need only recall the repeated US tariffs on European exports, or the US president's blunt criticisms of Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and other EU leaders. Let's be clear: the US' pragmatic and often cynical approach is not a temporary Trump-era phenomenon. Trump has simply said openly what policymakers in Washington — from both parties and the foreign policy establishment — have pursued for decades.

Claims by some EU ministers that relations with America will "revert to normality" with a new president reveal wishful thinking rather than strategy.

By extending a military alliance into trade — as if mutual defence required permanent economic preferences — Rome has unnecessarily restricted opportunities for Italian businesses, especially in the Global South. Italian firms in energy, infrastructure, agriculture and advanced manufacturing could gain enormously from deeper ties with Africa, Latin America and Asia. Ideological alignment has instead narrowed their horizon.

The Italian government insists it is strengthening ties with the Global South, and indeed the Mattei Plan and renewed Mediterranean outreach point in that direction. Yet the practical portfolio of new projects remains modest. The withdrawal from the BRI narrowed Italy's options for engaging with one of the world's largest infrastructure and connectivity initiatives.

Other examples of this disconnect with the Global South include the EU sanctions packages against Russia, which were introduced without comprehensive economic impact assessments and have damaged Italian and German manufacturing by reducing access to affordable energy. The Mattei Plan for Africa has yet to generate the scale of projects some had anticipated. The "Cotton Road", promoted as a Western alternative to Beijing's BRI, has stalled amid Middle East tensions — with its proposed European terminal in Greece's Piraeus, operated, ironically, by China's COSCO.

Italian and many EU leaders speak eloquently about the Global South, yet their actions remain trapped within an Atlantic-centric mindset that prioritizes geopolitical signaling over pragmatic economic diversification. In the end, these choices delivered the worst of both worlds: they limited infrastructure development and export opportunities while yielding fewer strategic or economic gains than expected.

When contradictions mount and growth stagnates, European leaders invoke "values" and the need to deal only with "like-minded" countries. Strained distinctions between "liberal democracies" and "autocratic regimes" multiply. This is the classic refuge when realism fails: values become an excuse for economic underperformance, presented as a noble price to avoid deeper engagement with the Global South. Of course, values matter, and Europe should defend democratic norms. Yet many threats to these norms stem from the EU's own regulatory overreach, suppression of dissent and centralisation of power. European governments are not NGOs or moral authorities. They are administrators of national interests. Their duty is to expand opportunities for citizens and businesses, not shrink them through ideological filters. Ethical choices belong to companies and individuals.

The multipolar world will not wait for Italy. While we debate affiliations, others are building infrastructure, value chains and win-win partnerships. Foreign policy should multiply opportunities, not obstruct them. Italy — with its geography, entrepreneurial spirit and Mediterranean location — has immense potential. Realizing it requires moving beyond reflexive Atlanticism and embracing a foreign policy grounded in realism, flexibility and the unapologetic pursuit of Italian interests. Only then can we truly thrive in the multipolar era.

The author is former undersecretary of state at the Italian Ministry of Economic Development.

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