China-Hungary relationship resilient

With Péter Magyar's Tisza party securing a constitutional super-majority and as the new government prepares to take the reins in Budapest, the obvious question in diplomatic circles from Brussels to Beijing is: Will Hungary's China policy change?

The outgoing Viktor Orbán government's foreign policy stood out sharply within the European Union: fiercely independent, often contrarian, and — crucially for Beijing — China-friendly.

Under Orbán, Hungary became one of China's closest partners in central Europe, a relationship that reached its symbolic apex during Chinese President Xi Jinping's state visit in 2024, when the two countries elevated their ties to an "all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership for the new era" — a designation that reflects the exceptional depth of bilateral engagement.

The bitterness of the electoral campaign might lead some observers to expect a sweeping reversal — including in Hungary's relations with China. That assumption, however, would be mistaken.

History offers an instructive precedent. When Orbán returned to power in 2010, many anticipated that he would dismantle the China-friendly course charted by his socialist predecessors.

What happened instead was the opposite. Not only did the warm approach to China remain intact, but it was actively deepened by the Orbán administration.

Budapest embraced its "Eastern Opening" doctrine, became an enthusiastic participant in the 16+1 framework, and was the first EU member state to join the Belt and Road Initiative cooperation.

Hungary consistently pushed back against the securitization of China policy within the EU, opposed tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, and emerged as one of the most important destinations for Chinese investment in Europe.

There is reason to expect that the transition would follow a broadly similar pattern.

To understand why, it is worth examining what actually drove Hungary's political earthquake. Tisza and Orbán's Fidesz party are not ideological opposites — both are center-right parties sharing broadly similar worldviews. What drove voters was a desire for renewal at home — economic expectations and questions of governance — not any appetite for a more confrontational foreign policy. China barely featured in the campaign. Certain China-linked projects drew criticism at the margins, but none became a defining issue.

On the battery factories operating or under construction in Hungary — several of them Chinese-owned — Magyar was explicit: he has no intention of shutting them down. His proposed changes are interpreted as regulatory rather than political: a national oversight body for the battery industry, a dedicated environment ministry, and stricter environmental standards.

The most substantive signal came from Anita Orbán — no relation to the outgoing prime minister — Tisza's designated foreign minister. She noted that despite years of "Eastern Opening" rhetoric, Hungary's exports to China had declined as a share of total exports, while Chinese imports had grown significantly.

Her conclusion, however, was pragmatic rather than hostile: Hungary needs a close economic relationship with China, and the goal should be to build a more balanced and mutually beneficial partnership. "This is the pragmatic course that Tisza will follow," she wrote.

The remaining doubts were dispelled at Magyar's first post-election news conference, where he described China as one of the world's most important, largest and most powerful countries, expressed a personal desire to visit Beijing and welcomed Chinese leaders to Budapest.

On investment, he laid out three conditions: firms should comply with Hungarian and EU environmental, health, and safety standards; investment needs to deliver tangible benefits to the Hungarian economy; and — in a notably constructive touch — he expressed hope that Hungarian companies could become suppliers to major Chinese investors such as BYD and CATL.

The tone was a clear signal to pursue pragmatic engagement on new and more reciprocal terms.

The new government could be more Western-oriented than its predecessor, and repairing Hungary's frayed relationship with the EU will be a central priority.

Yet this realignment need not come at the expense of ties with China — and crucially, it is not something Brussels actually demands.

The conditions attached to Hungary's access to EU funds concern the rule of law, judicial independence, and anti-corruption measures; not one of them touches China policy. What is likely to change is tone rather than substance. Under Orbán, Hungary picked visible fights with EU institutions over China — on tariffs, on "de-risking", on the framing of Beijing as a so-called "systemic rival".

Magyar's government is unlikely to carry that banner. Instead, Budapest may pursue its Chinese relationships more quietly, joining the broad group of EU member states that have settled on pragmatic economic engagement with China as their default position.

The bottom line for Beijing is straightforward. Hungary is changing governments, not the course. The foundations of the relationship — investments, infrastructure and institutional ties built over more than two decades — remain firmly in place.

The new government brings different rhetoric and stricter standards, but no appetite for antagonism toward China. If anything, a more EU-compliant Hungary could act as a more reliable and durable partner for Beijing: more stable and more predictable.

And with Hungarian companies now actively seeking to integrate into the supply chains of major Chinese investors, the relationship carries the promise of deeper industrial ties than ever before. Pragmatism, after all, is not a concession, but the foundation. And on that foundation, Hungary and China have every reason to keep building.

The author is the head of the Department of Chinese Studies at Pázmány Péter Catholic University in Budapest and a senior researcher at the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs.

The views don't necessarily reflect those of China Daily.

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