Rising above differences
How the US adjusts its climate diplomacy policies determines whether China-US climate cooperation can advance
The 28th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations' Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 28) will be held at the end of November in Dubai, the United Arab Emirates. As the global climate crisis develops at an accelerated pace, the global climate governance system is entering a phase of major changes. The policy choices of China and the United States in their climate diplomacy will have far-reaching historic significance.
As the biggest emitter among developed countries, the US has a poor track record in global climate actions that truly help cope with the climate crisis — such as in fulfilling its climate fund pledge, funding for loss and damage, and the transfer of green technologies.
Instead, it has attempted to bypass the UN multilateral climate governance framework based on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement, by constantly expanding and consolidating its own "Green Alliance" network and proposing all sorts of climate governance rules at mini-multilateral platforms, which gradually erode the cornerstone of global climate governance — the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities" (CBDR). It also attempted to use the COP 28 as an important opportunity to further undermine the CBDR principle and pressurize developing countries to resubmit their Nationally Determined Contributions and contribute to the loss and damage fund under the same standards with developed countries. These moves will allow the US to achieve its ultimate goal of dominating and reshaping the climate governance rules in its own favor.
Therefore, in the Joe Biden administration's climate diplomacy policy toward China, competition far outweighs cooperation. Worse still, the US' strategic competition with China poses new challenges to constructive climate cooperation between China and the US in the years to come.
To start with, the US' systemic strategic competition with China will directly affect the stability of China-US climate cooperation.
The Biden administration's first formal national security strategy identifies China as "America's most consequential geopolitical challenge" while stressing the importance of building the strongest possible coalition of nations and pursuing a dual-track approach based on ideology to shape the global strategic environment. The Biden administration places climate issues at the core of its national security and foreign policy. This will inevitably bring about profound changes to the international landscape and the global order.
Second, the US legislature is promoting an act to strip China of its "developing nation" status, which not only threatens the foundation of China-US climate cooperation, but will deal a heavy blow to the global climate governance system and directly damage the cornerstone of the global consensus — the "common but differentiated responsibilities" principle enshrined in the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. The US aims to escape from its historical obligation for emissions reductions as the world's largest emitter among developed countries and shift the emissions reductions obligation to the developing nations.
Third, the US-proposed policies aimed at safeguarding so-called economic security have disrupted the global clean energy supply chains.
On May 20, the leaders of the G7 issued the G7 Leaders' Statement on Economic Resilience and Economic Security. The meeting marks an attempt by the US to launch its all-round China containment strategy centering on such areas as key supply chains and clean energy by relying on its alliances in the Asia-Pacific region, under the pretext of safeguarding "economic security".
The clean energy supply chains referring to renewable energy, decarbonization and green infrastructure, US has joined hands with its allies to promote a "clean economy", by launching the US-Japan Climate Partnership, the US-Japan Clean Energy and Energy Security Initiative and the Strategic Clean Energy Partnership, etc. Furthermore, to set rule barriers in the clean energy supply chain, the Quad has established joint principles for clean energy supply chains. Such clean energy supply chains alliances and principles will have a crowding-out effect on China's low-carbon technology products. So one of the strategic goals of the "economic security" is to squeeze China's position and space in the net-zero economic global value chain.
Fourth, the US is promoting climate security in the "Indo-Pacific region" to stir up trouble in the regional security situation. As climate security increasingly plays a central role in ensuring global security, the US is vigorously building a global security architecture centering on "climate security".
The US has deepened cooperation with "Indo-Pacific" allies and partners through the "Indo-Pacific Climate Resilience and Adaptation Strategy", strengthening its relations with US allies and partners. For example, the Quad proposed the "Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness Partnership (IPMDA)"in May 2022. Nominally providing partners with the ability to respond to weather and humanitarian events and protect their fisheries, the IPMDA essentially tracks and monitors the shipping and other maritime military activities of rival nations and will provide the US and its partners with real-time active maritime security situation in regional waters. So the US is actively building a non-traditional security architecture centered on climate security.
The US' policies in the aforementioned four areas pose severe challenges to pragmatic climate cooperation between China and the US. When meeting with US ambassador to China Nicholas Burns in Beijing, Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Qin Gang emphasized that the US should correct its perception of China, and reinstate a rational policy toward China. The US should not talk about communication while continuously suppressing and containing China. The US must not say one thing but do the opposite.
The US adjusting its relevant strategies and policies is the premise for advancing China-US climate cooperation.
China has proposed the Global Security Initiative, which upholds a vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security. The initiative advocates that humanity should uphold the win-win mentality to cope with complex, intertwined security challenges and encourage joint international efforts to bring more certainty and stability to the turbulent world to achieve lasting peace and development.
The US should, from the height of safeguarding global sustainable security, uphold and implement the important consensus reached by the two heads of state on the significance of bilateral relations and opposition to a new Cold War, respect other countries' national conditions, take actions based on the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement, and prevent ideological differences from adversely impacting China-US climate cooperation.
In the future, China and the US could explore new areas of climate cooperation in such areas as building a fair, reasonable, cooperative and win-win global climate governance architecture, realizing harmonious co-existence between human and nature, accelerating the global green transformation and jointly building a community of all life on earth.
Specifically, the two countries could work together to allow the COP 28 to play a bigger role in advancing full and effective implementation of the Paris Agreement, strengthen the interconnectivity of the two countries' clean energy markets, and bolster cooperation on net-zero technologies. They should reach a consensus on cooperation on clean supply chains and jointly safeguard the stability and completeness of the global clean energy supply chain system.
The author is an associate researcher with the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University. The author contributed this article to China Watch, a think tank powered by China Daily. The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.
Contact the editor at editor@chinawatch.cn.