Op-Ed Contributors

Debate: Sino-US ties

(China Daily)
Updated: 2010-04-26 08:03

Jiang Wenran: How to achieve strategic understanding

Relations between the United States and China have been at a low point in recent months. Tensions over US arms sales to Taiwan, President Barack Obama's meeting with the Dalai Lama, disputes over the value of China's currency, a supposed snub of Obama by Chinese leaders at December's Copenhagen climate summit, and the rupture between Google and China have all played a role.

But President Hu Jintao's visit to Washington for the nuclear security summit, which followed a phone conversation between him and Obama, has set the stage for a serious and calm exchange of views on a range of bilateral and international issues, including Iran's nuclear program.

This calming of the diplomatic atmosphere was helped considerably by US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner delaying his report to Congress on whether China is a currency manipulator. Geithner even made a quick stop in Beijing on April 8 to meet Chinese Vice-Premier Wang Qishan, prompting reports that China may let the renminbi float more flexibly.

Nevertheless, before anyone concludes that US-China ties are warming up, it is worth noting that the two countries have starkly different views on how to manage their relationship.

Take the recent Obama-Hu telephone conversation. Reports in the US following the hour-long exchange praised it as a turning point in bilateral relations, and headlines emphasized that Obama worked on Hu to achieve a common stand in sanctioning Iran over its pursuit of nuclear weapons.

Yet Chinese news releases gave no indication of such a "breakthrough." Instead, they stressed Hu's demand that the US side "properly handle" the Taiwan and Tibet issues, which represent China's "core interests." There was not even a mention that the two leaders discussed Iran, other than one line saying that they exchanged views on international issues of common concern.

Such discrepancies reflect a broader perception gap. On the American side, the emerging consensus is that the Obama administration began its term committed to working closely with China on a range of issues. It took extra steps in not being openly critical of China's currency policy, launched the high-profile US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, delayed a meeting with the Dalai Lama prior to Obama's China trip, and showed substantial patience with China's concerns at the Copenhagen conference.

But that conciliatory approach, which brought Obama domestic criticism, did not seem to be appreciated by the Chinese. Instead, China displayed sharp anger at the US arms sale to Taiwan, something that has been going on for decades, and to Obama's low-key meeting with the Dalai Lama. Many in the Obama administration now ask: what is the point of being nice when it brings no obvious benefits?

On the Chinese side, the initial accommodating approach by Obama, although met with a level of caution and skepticism, was perceived as an inevitable reflection of China's rise and more equal status with the US. After all, many argue, China continues to buy US treasury bonds and now shoulders the largest amount of US debt, thus financing whatever the Americans are doing, from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to health-care reform at home.

China has played a vital role in getting the global economy onto a speedier path to recovery, thanks to its effective stimulus package. China is also expected to help resolve the nuclear standoffs with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Iran, two counties that are hostile to the US but less of a threat to China.

So China's leaders felt a sense of betrayal when Obama, shortly after his positive visit to Beijing, went ahead with the arms sales to Taiwan and the meeting with the Dalai Lama. Many mainstream, liberal-minded Chinese academics complain that there is no fresh US approach to China. Rather, these are old policies that do not accommodate China's new status or respond to "Chinese kindness."

The problem is not a lack of communication channels. Both countries have interacted with each other for almost four decades. There are no language problems, few cultural barriers, and plenty of conferences and personal correspondence. We have seen elegant op-eds written on both sides, more or less articulating how one side is right and the other side wrong. The end result? They talk past each other rather than with each other.

The fundamental issue in today's US-China relations is the strategic visions that both governments are developing to cope with China's rise. Americans tend to think that what is good for America must be good for the world. But China - and much of the world, for that matter - may not agree. Both countries must acknowledge that they have their own domestic and foreign policy priorities. Some may be shared; some not. Others may conflict. To accommodate and bridge their different interests, the US and China need to engage in more than just frank discussions. Tangible strategic concessions from both sides must be made in order to promote cooperation and avoid confrontation.

The author is chair of the China Institute at the University of Alberta and senior fellow of the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada. He is a former public policy fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington DC.

Project Syndicate

(China Daily 04/26/2010 page9)

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