A new but still uncertain format of geopolitics in Asia has been taking shape in the past 30 years. China's policy of reform and opening-up adopted in the late 1970s has not only driven its economic development forward at a sustained high speed but also changed its relations with the outside world, especially the West.

Meanwhile, as China's economy grows, its defense modernization marches ahead as well. China's all-round modernization is bound to impact the outside world.

After the Cold War ended, the United States became the sole superpower in the world, but its international behavior remains in Cold-War mode. It keeps looking for outside adversaries and rivals while trying to forge political and military-flavored alliances with other countries.

In Asia, China is usually considered a US rival or competitor. To many Asian countries, the rise of China's economy is already a fact. China's rise has been cited as one of the key factors causing the ongoing geopolitical tectonic shift in Asia.

That said, one should not over-emphasize the China factor when discussing the geopolitical change in Asia. There are other factors impacting Asia's geopolitical transformation just as strongly, such as the rise of Japan and India.

This means there is no single major power in Asia capable of leading regional affairs. The most important feature of Asia's geopolitics is the coexistence of several major powers.

Japan has been an economic major power for decades and is now seeking to become a political and military major power. Meanwhile, the populous India is also on the rise.

Traditionally India's political elites tended to lean toward the West, but they are now increasingly identifying with Asia as the region rises to prominence. India's strategic focus is on Asia, and spreading its influence in Asia is the main trend of its policies.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is transforming itself as well. In recent years, ASEAN has found a new position in regional affairs in response to the rise of China, Japan and India.

In the absence of a long-established well-working platform for the major powers in Asia, the importance of ASEAN has grabbed the attention of all parties concerned. Be it China, India, Japan or even the US, no major power can afford to ignore ASEAN as a platform for interaction. ASEAN now commands a critical position in Asia's geopolitics.

The simultaneous emergence of all these factors shows the complexity of Asia's geopolitics. Judging from the interactions of these factors in recent years, it is possible for Asia's geopolitics to assume the traditional military-politics-oriented and Cold-War-flavored format or one that is economy-oriented and conforms to the post-Cold-War trend of regionalization and globalization.

For a long stretch of time in the foreseeable future, the realities of Asia's geopolitical situation will very likely shift between the military-oriented traditional format and the new economy-oriented format, with political factors working as determinants of the direction it takes.

China will play a key role in this process.

The China factor is giving rise to an open Asia. The development from ASEAN to "10+3" (the 10 ASEAN member nations plus China, Japan and South Korea) and "10+1" (ASEAN plus China) has shown the openness of the regional organizations in Asia.

The East Asia Summit (EAS) is also well known for its openness. It is inseparable from the "10+3" mechanism and represents a major step forward on the basis of the "10+3".

China is the leading advocate of EAS, but it is not seeking to play the leader's role in EAS, though it has been a key player.

China has supported ASEAN as the leading figure in East Asian affairs since the very beginning. Chinese leaders have stated time and again that China will not seek a dominant position in this region. This shows China's commitment to a peaceful rise to power. The fact that China has repeatedly emphasized the leading role of ASEAN in East Asia affairs is unusual in international relations.

China's reason for this is clear. It believes this is what a responsible rising major power should do. At the same time, China also emphasizes the openness of ASEAN and other regional organizations.

However, it has always been difficult to handle the relationship between regional organizations and their relations with international organizations. Washington has been concerned that EAS would become a China-led exclusive regional club to counter the US. But EAS now includes Australia, New Zealand and India, which proves the regional summit is quite open.

What China has done in this respect is very different from the traditional way major powers behaved as they rose. Many Americans are concerned China will carry out its own version of the Monroe Doctrine in a bid to force US influence out of Asia.

That is what the US as a rising power did to Europe, but not what China is doing. China is not trying to undercut US influence in Asia in any sense of the word. All China wants is to share the responsibility of maintaining regional security and the regional space for international exchanges with the US.

That is the essence of the concept of a regional organization's openness that China has been emphasizing.

China is not seeking to use any East Asian organization to counter other regional groups. This is a new way of thinking about regional organizations in the context of globalization. Better integration and coordination of Asia is not aimed at making Asia a closed region but a more open one.

This way of thinking and policy expression, which are different from the traditional geopolitical concept centered on military strength and security, are well suited for the historical trend of globalization and regionalization. To a considerable extent these factors are driving the arrival of a brand new Asian order.

It is not hard to see that a new format of Asian geopolitics is taking shape, though its development will be a very difficult process. It is an extraordinary responsibility for China as a regional major power in this process. It is also part of China's responsibility to pursue a different pattern of regional and global political behavior for a civilized major power.

The author is a professor and research director of China Policy Institute, University of Nottingham, England.

The article was presented at last month's Shanghai Forum

(China Daily 06/13/2007 page11)