Imbalance corrector

BRICS provides the means for the Global South to have greater collective influence in global governance

Nearly a decade has passed since the 2017 Xiamen Summit set the goal of a second "Golden Decade" of BRICS cooperation. The progress made since then should not be judged simply by the number of summits held or declarations adopted. The more important change is structural: BRICS has evolved from a coordination mechanism among five major emerging economies into a wider, development-oriented platform for the Global South.

This transformation has occurred along three connected dimensions. BRICS has expanded its membership, broadened its agenda and developed institutions capable of translating political consensus into practical cooperation. China has played a particularly important role in all three processes.

China's first contribution has been to make BRICS more open.

The concept of "BRICS Plus", introduced at the 2017 Xiamen Summit, represented more than a diplomatic outreach exercise. It offered an answer to a fundamental question facing BRICS: how could the mechanism expand its global relevance without becoming an unwieldy organization?

BRICS Plus provided a flexible solution. It enabled the original members to engage other emerging markets and developing countries on the basis of equality and voluntary participation. Countries did not have to become full members before taking part in dialogue and practical cooperation.

This approach gradually changed the membership identity of BRICS. It was no longer simply a grouping defined by five large economies. It was becoming a platform connecting Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East.

China gave further momentum to this process during its BRICS chairmanship in 2022, when members began substantive discussions on the principles, standards and procedures for expansion. Those discussions paved the way for the enlargement decisions that followed. BRICS now comprises 11 members and 10 partner countries, while the partner-country category established at the 2024 Kazan Summit has created a more stable framework for broader participation.

The importance of this expansion is not merely numerical. It has increased the geographical reach and political representation of BRICS and brought together energy producers and consumers, manufacturing powers, major agricultural economies and some of the world's fastest-growing markets. It has also given more Global South countries a regular channel through which to participate in discussions on international finance, trade, technology and global governance.

China's second major contribution has been to broaden the substance of BRICS cooperation.

Economic and financial cooperation remains the foundation of BRICS. Yet China has consistently supported the development of a more comprehensive structure based on political and security cooperation, economic and financial partnership, and cultural and people-to-people exchanges.

As a result, BRICS cooperation now covers public health, food and energy security, counterterrorism, cybersecurity, anti-corruption, industrialization, digital transformation, climate change, space technology, education and artificial intelligence. This broader agenda reflects the reality that development challenges do not exist in isolation. Financial instability, technological exclusion, public health emergencies and geopolitical tensions can reinforce one another.

China has helped connect the BRICS agenda with the wider development concerns of the Global South. Its emphasis on poverty reduction, industrialization, infrastructure, food security and digital connectivity has helped keep development at the center of the mechanism. Its advocacy of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security has also encouraged BRICS to address security without turning itself into a military alliance.

Faced with increasing cross-border health risks and their wider economic and social consequences, BRICS strengthened coordination on vaccine research, infectious-disease control, public health systems and supply-chain resilience. The BRICS Vaccine Research and Development Center was created as a platform for joint research, production and knowledge-sharing, while related initiatives promoted remote medical services and more equitable access to essential medical products.

Technological cooperation has likewise moved from general declarations toward more specialized mechanisms. Work under the BRICS Partnership on New Industrial Revolution now encompasses industrial internet applications, digital manufacturing, innovation and skills development. The BRICS remote-sensing satellite arrangement has supported data sharing in areas such as climate research, disaster management, environmental protection and agriculture.

China's third contribution has been to provide institutional support and public goods.

The New Development Bank is the best example. Headquartered in Shanghai, it has grown from an institution with a limited initial portfolio into an operational multilateral development bank. By the end of 2025, it had approved 139 projects with total financing of $42.9 billion. These projects cover transport, clean energy, water and sanitation, environmental protection, social infrastructure and digital connectivity.

The significance of the bank goes beyond the volume of its lending. It provides emerging and developing economies with an additional source of development finance and supports greater use of local currencies. This is particularly valuable when many Global South countries face rising debt-servicing costs, volatile exchange rates and insufficient access to affordable long-term financing.

The BRICS Partnership on New Industrial Revolution Innovation Center in Xiamen offers another example of China's approach. It converts a broad political commitment to technological cooperation into training programs, policy exchanges, industrial partnerships and project matchmaking. China has also supported vocational education cooperation, women's innovation and entrepreneurship, satellite data applications and public health research.

These platforms illustrate a central feature of China's role: proposals are most valuable when they are accompanied by institutions and projects. The appeal of BRICS does not rest solely on its criticism of imbalances in the existing international order. It also depends on whether it can offer credible development alternatives.

Expansion therefore creates both an opportunity and a test.

For many developing countries, BRICS provides a way to move from fragmented participation in global governance toward greater collective influence. Through BRICS, they can coordinate positions on reform of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, climate finance, international taxation, digital governance and representation in international institutions.

It can also widen their practical development choices. More diverse financing, trade, payment, technology and industrial partnerships can reduce excessive dependence on any single market or financial channel. This is not about replacing one dependency with another. It is about increasing the policy space and development options available to Global South countries.

BRICS should consequently not be understood as an exclusive geopolitical bloc or an alliance directed against any third party. Its deeper purpose is to promote a more representative international order and a more inclusive form of globalization. While the existing model of globalization has generated growth, it has also produced uneven access to finance, technology and value-chain gains. BRICS can help correct these imbalances by enabling more countries to participate in rulemaking and move into higher-value economic activities.

But enlargement will not automatically generate development benefits. A larger membership also means more diverse interests and higher coordination costs. Political declarations do not by themselves build infrastructure, transfer technology or create employment.

The next stage must therefore move from expansion to delivery. BRICS Plus and the partner-country mechanism can help by allowing flexible, project-based cooperation. Not every country needs to participate in every initiative. Groups of interested members and partners could move forward in fields such as renewable energy, artificial intelligence, agriculture, health or cross-border payments, with successful projects later opened to wider participation.

China's return to the BRICS chairmanship in 2027 will provide an important opportunity to guide this transition. It will mark the 10th anniversary of the Xiamen Declaration. The task of the next phase is to turn the political weight of a larger BRICS into measurable development outcomes.

He Yun is an associate professor at the School of Public Administration at Hunan University and a researcher at the Belt and Road Institute at Tsinghua University. Zhao Yi is a researcher at the China-Arab Research Center for Culture and Tourism Cooperation at the Beijing International Studies University.

The authors contributed this article to China Watch, a think tank powered by China Daily. The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.

Contact the editor at editor@chinawatch.cn.