The spies who are not shy of being known: China Daily editorial

The Central Intelligence Agency is not known for being a publicity seeker. Its first tweet, in 2014, was a masterpiece of tongue-in-cheek institutional coyness: "We can neither confirm nor deny that this is our first tweet."

Interesting then that Michael Ellis, the agency's deputy director, seems more willing to stick his head above this self-constructed parapet.

On Tuesday, Ellis appeared at the Billington CyberSecurity Summit in Washington and explained, with unusual candor, how the CIA is expanding its intelligence work regarding China. Urging the agency to recalibrate its approach to meet the distinctly modern challenges posed by China — particularly in the economic and high-tech domains — he suggested Chinese companies were "legitimate targets" for action.

He gave voice to a transformation already visible elsewhere in Washington: China policy has increasingly become a whole-of-government endeavor. The US State Department has its China House. The Pentagon has its China Task Force. Congress has its China Select Committee. The CIA has a China Mission Center. Both Democrats and Republicans seem comfortable with export controls, investment restrictions and other methods of making life difficult for Chinese enterprises.

The US and China remain locked in a unique strategic coexistence. They trade on a large scale, compete fiercely and maintain regular diplomatic contact to avoid turning tensions into conflict.

Washington is intensifying its efforts to build capabilities to comprehensively outcompete China across the technological and economic landscape. But US strategists should ask whether the all-in strategy is in the country's best interests.

Tariffs, export controls, investment restrictions, technology bans and critical materials supply-chain diversification are gradually dismantling pieces of the economic architecture that once encouraged the two sides to engage in win-win cooperation in many fields. The result is not so much a new workable system as a collection of patches.

The US administration's campaign against Chinese goods allegedly entering the US through third countries illustrates the difficulty. Its proposed answer is an increasingly sophisticated customs apparatus, using AI to track global trade.

This will encourage more companies to redesign supply chains, relocate production and spend extra money to prove that they are not doing anything that might trigger suppressive actions against them. The US is also coercing other countries to join its effort, harming their economies. But most countries have no particular desire to choose sides.

Nor does Washington's treatment of US companies make the sales pitch especially easy. Ford has been publicly pressured over its relationships with Chinese partners, including CATL.

Huawei, meanwhile, is facing a criminal racketeering trial in New York over baseless allegations including so-called "technology theft" and "sanctions violations". The broader message is unmistakable: commercial decisions involving China are increasingly becoming politicized decisions.

Allies may reasonably wonder what this means for them. From its trade pressure on Canada and its geopolitical maneuvering over Danish-owned Greenland to its energy policies toward Venezuela and its strong-arm tactics in negotiating with the European Union — the US administration's actions mean that being a US partner can sometimes bring more harm than being its rival.

There is a still larger paradox. Much of the US' China strategy rests on the anxiety that China will eventually overtake the US as the world's leading power. Some US politicians have an unfortunate habit of assuming that everyone else secretly wants to usurp the US from pole position. This has become a strategic trap. They fear China's rise, so they restrict China's access to technology and markets. China responds by developing more technology at home and cultivating alternative markets. Washington then points to China's growing resilience as proof that it is an even greater "threat".

As Ellis' speech indicated, the Cold War spies may have come in from the cold, but the US is still tilting at windmills.

On the surface, Washington insists the two countries should cooperate where possible, compete where necessary and keep talking throughout. Technology, trade and security channels should remain open precisely when relations are difficult.

Yet should Washington persist in ratcheting up its containment of China, the aforementioned cooperation-competition-communication model risks being seen for what it is: a delaying tactic, designed to gain breathing room and exhaust Beijing's forbearance.