France and Germany at the crossroads with rise of far right

The rise of the far right in France and Germany is a man-made phenomenon — and the men and women who made it are the very politicians now wringing their hands about it. The National Rally of France and Alternative for Germany are prospering because the mainstream parties in the two countries seem incapable of offering plausible answers to the questions ordinary people are asking in some critical sectors.

Germany's eastern states see extremely low approval ratings of the Friedrich Merz government's performance. In France, Marine Le Pen leads the first-round polls for 2027 with over 30 percent, while the centrist camp has fragmented into squabbling factions. These are verdicts on the incumbent parties.

The root causes are structural and have been evident for years. Globalization has enriched the few while leaving vast swathes of the middle and working classes feeling abandoned in many places. Industrial offshoring, the energy transition and digital disruption have created a pervasive sense of economic insecurity.

Meanwhile, mass immigration has fueled cultural anxiety, particularly in small towns and rural areas where traditional ways of life feel under threat. Mainstream parties have offered technocratic management when voters wanted leadership, and European integration when they wanted national protection. The gap between what governments deliver and what the people expect has become a chasm.

The Franco-German engine — once the motor of European integration — seems to be running on fumes. Paris and Berlin have been preoccupied with internal squabbles rather than delivering the economic reforms desperately needed.

Germany's infrastructure is creaking in many regions, its bureaucracy in some departments is sclerotic and its dependence on cheap Russian energy has left its industry struggling now when it is no longer available.

France's labor market remains rigid, its public finances are stretched and its political class seems more interested in preserving its privileges than in solving problems.

Neither government has been honest enough with its people about the trade-offs required to sustain the European social model in a more competitive global economy. Instead they like blaming domestic problems on foreign countries.

Instead of confronting these realities, mainstream parties have resorted to two evasive strategies. The first is the "cordon sanitaire" — refusing to cooperate with the far right while hoping it will simply go away. This has allowed the AfD and RN to pose as the main challengers to the establishment.

The second is policy mimicry — adopting far-right positions on immigration and sovereignty while pretending this does not normalize far-right ideology.

The result is the worst of both worlds: mainstream parties appear both weak and opportunistic, while the far right appears both principled and ascendant.

The way out is not through more fencing. It is through honest engagement with the problems that have driven voters toward the extremes. The cost of living is not a perception; it is a reality. The strain on public services from immigration is not a fiction; it is a fact. The sense that Brussels tries to dictate while national parliaments defer is not a conspiracy theory; it is a governance deficit.

Governments must therefore act — credibly, visibly and urgently. That means investing in infrastructure, education and energy independence. It means reforming welfare states to reward work and penalize idleness. It means confronting the uncomfortable truth that the European project, in its current form, has not delivered for large numbers of citizens.

This is not a call to abandon Europe. It is a call to save it — by making it work for the people who live in it. The far right is good at exploiting nostalgia and resentment. The center must offer a future worth believing in. The longer it takes to do so, the higher the price will be. The fence is already creaking. If it falls, it will fall on everyone.