Washington's Venezuela petroleum grab an act of desperation, not real strength: China Daily editorial
The United States' "agreement" with North American Blue Energy Partners, or NABEP, to expand production and commercialize Venezuela's petroleum reserves includes fields operated by Chinese enterprises.
The US administration's unilateral assertion that China won't have any debt claims to the revenue from new oil production by NABEP, as announced by US Energy Secretary Chris Wright, is a troubling declaration of a dangerous "principle": Washington believes it can decide by presidential fiat which contracts remain valid, which creditors get paid and which foreign interests are simply disregarded.
China provided tens of billions of dollars to Venezuela through multiple loan contracts that were to be repaid with oil shipments. That debt is the obligation of the Venezuelan state regardless of who operates Venezuela's oil fields. NABEP's control over the country's oil production does not override the existence of the debt.
As China's Foreign Ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun said, China-Venezuela cooperation is protected by international law and the laws of both countries. The cooperation does not concern any third party and should not be subjected to interference by any third party. China's lawful rights and interests in Venezuela must be safeguarded.
Chinese companies did not arrive in Venezuela by gunboat. Their oil projects and commercial arrangements were established through legitimate agreements with the Venezuelan government. China's loans extended under the oil-for-loan framework created creditor relationships that cannot simply be wished away because the US has now struck a new deal with Venezuela.
Venezuela is hardly an isolated case. Washington has already strong-armed Panama into terminating contracts with a Hong Kong company that operated the ports at either end of the Panama Canal. It has also constructed an increasingly broad architecture of trade bullying, unilateral sanctions and technology blockades against China that encompasses scientific research, shipping, finance, artificial intelligence and energy. A think tank in Washington is even openly discussing "extreme measures", such as military strikes on Chinese data centers, to prevent China from gaining an advantage in advanced AI. That such rhetoric can circulate so openly — and so close to the White House — is startling.
With the forthcoming midterm elections, the US administration faces a confluence of looming economic crises primarily of its own making. The US' national debt has breached the $40 trillion mark, and interest payments on federal debt have reached a staggering $1.17 trillion this fiscal year alone. Inflation — stoked in no small part by the US' disastrous military actions, along with Israel, against Iran — has pushed gasoline prices to an August record. A recent Financial Times/Focaldata poll shows that 53 percent of US people feel they are worse off than when the administration took office.
Washington's China-targeted moves are a bid to fill the economic shortfall at home by plundering abroad and to project an image of strength that may not hold up. In an era when legitimate commercial interests can become geopolitical targets overnight, the practice of countering these moves is becoming the new normal. The US can expect reciprocal countermeasures from China, which has developed a comprehensive policy, institutional and legal system in response to foreign coercion, restrictions and bullying.
The US' rhetoric may be loud, but many of its measures targeting China harm the interests of its own and US allies. Mexican Foreign Minister Roberto Velasco Alvarez's visit to China from Sunday to Monday comes as Mexico faces US pressure concerning Chinese enterprises. The visit is conducive to managing such pressure properly within the bilateral framework between China and Mexico, rather than allowing a third country to dictate economic choices.
At a meeting of G20 finance ministers and central bank governors last week, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent sought to rally partners around so-called "trade concerns" over China while accusing Beijing of insufficient "cooperation" for restrictive measures targeting China, a combination that has become a familiar feature of the US administration's arrogance.
Washington expects China to be a customer when the US needs customers — US officials hope to make announcements soon on agriculture to encourage more US sales to China — but regards China as a "threat" when the US fears competition. This pattern, demanding that China buy when it suits US interests, while coercing allies to exclude Chinese companies when China becomes too competitive, is not a strategy; it is a contradiction.
China will continue to use its industrial depth, vast market, growing technological capabilities and close connection with the world to safeguard its core development interests. The US energy chief's Venezuela remarks may have been intended as a show of strength. Instead, it underscores that when one country starts treating contracts, debts and sovereign economic relations as spoils to be distributed at will, it merely teaches everyone else to prepare for a world in which US coercion must be answered — and resisted.































