Steering new dynamics in Asia-Pacific

Editor's Note: The 14th World Peace Forum was co-hosted by Tsinghua University and the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs in Beijing from July 2 to 4. A panel discussion examined how evolving regional dynamics can shape the future of Asia-Pacific cooperation on July 3. Three panelists shared their views, as reported by China Daily's Li Huixian.

Rethinking cooperation in the Asia-Pacific

It's a consensus that preserving peace, stability, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific is a shared priority, and that enhancing cooperation is both a necessary and achievable goal.

Peace and prosperity cannot be taken for granted because of the changes that have taken place in the global order. Therefore, it is necessary to achieve more impactful cooperation.

Some national and sub-national actors believe that the establishment of "trust" is a necessary condition for cooperation on specific issues. Others contend that the best — or only — way to develop trust is by working together on consequential problems. These are not simply hypothetical alternatives.

They reflect the real-world differences in approach between the ways Chinese and American people define challenges and formulate strategies to address them. Determining the preferred approach of potential participants would seem to be a useful, and perhaps necessary, initial step.

Framing the challenge of cooperation in this way illuminates another question: Is the primary goal of cooperation to alleviate specific threats or to improve and stabilize the fundamental relationships among nations and regions?

How one frames and approaches opportunities for cooperation will differ if the primary objective is to use cooperation on specific problems as a means to improve overarching relationships rather than just solve common problems.

For example, collaboration to check the spread of disease exacerbated by global warming might be pursued differently if the primary goal is reducing friction between two or more countries than if it is to manage disease vectors.

How should goals be prioritized? The question can be answered in many ways, but I wish to introduce another "chicken and egg" dimension of the process. One way is to consider the advantages and disadvantages of establishing or repurposing mechanisms to facilitate particular forms of cooperation. An alternative approach would be to use lessons from specific cases of cooperation to design mechanisms and rules for cooperation on other challenges.

My experience and understanding of interactions in the Asia-Pacific suggest a preference for institution building as a necessary condition for collaboration on specified challenges.

Do we need more organizations and, if so, why and what should they look like? Are some existing structures more essential or amenable to reform than others?

A second parameter is the relationship between structures and behaviors. In the region, national-level actors tend to prioritize the establishment of purpose-built organizations to facilitate cooperation. There is a long list of regional and sub-regional groupings established in recent decades to facilitate cooperation on general or specific challenges.

The fact that we are addressing the subject today attests to the inadequacy of past efforts.

Building structures entails debates and decisions about membership, procedures, and priorities, typically as a prerequisite for determining the substantive challenges to address and how to address them.

An alternative approach would be to attach greater urgency to addressing transnational challenges than to building institutions and refining procedures.

This approach prioritizes cooperation, emphasizing behavior over building new structures.

Formal institutional structures raise questions about eligibility. Can all Asia-Pacific countries participate in collective undertakings? Should eligibility be determined by geography, political alignment, vulnerability to the challenge or other criteria?

Common sense suggests that participation should be open to all affected by the problem or able to contribute to its amelioration. Will common sense prevail or be trumped by historical animosities, current alliance structures, or sanctions? Answers to such questions are neither obvious nor automatic.

Effective mechanisms ensure manageable order

Two factors have contributed to relative peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific. The first is economic interdependence. The economies of the region have become deeply interconnected through trade, investment, production, networks, and technological cooperation. Sustained economic growth in the region has created strong incentives for stability and collaboration.

The second is the relatively effective regional institutional framework. While no single institution guarantees peace in the Asia-Pacific, multilayered frameworks provide platforms for peaceful dispute resolution, confidence-building measures and crisis management.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations leads the regional dialogue, consultation and communication through various mechanisms.

Together, these factors create an environment where competition remains generally manageable. In recent months, the strategic landscape of the region has shown signs of stabilization, notably the modest easing of stress and competition between the United States and China.

This competition extends far beyond traditional military issues to encompass technologies, supply chains, economic security, artificial intelligence, social security, and access to critical resources. The relationship between Washington and Beijing is becoming one of the defining factors in regional affairs.

Recent interactions between two heads of state highlighted both the persistence of strategic competition and the necessity of sustained dialogue.

Competition between the two powers is likely to continue in the years ahead, but neither side benefits from the instability arising from that competition.

In this regard, the recent agreement on "constructive strategic stability" is a welcome development. If implemented effectively, it could significantly contribute to peace and stability across the Asia-Pacific.

While US-China competition is an important factor, it's not the whole story. Other powers, such as the Republic of Korea, Australia, and Indonesia, are assuming increasingly important regional roles.

With ASEAN continuing to be a vital platform for dialogue and cooperation, the Asia-Pacific region is gradually moving toward a more multipolar and interconnected regional order. This transition presents both opportunities and challenges. A broader distribution of influence can contribute to a more balanced regional architecture, but it may also intensify competition and complicate regional governance.

Today, Asia has multiple layers of security cooperation, and the traditional alliance system continues to play an important role in maintaining strategic stability.

At the same time, ASEAN-led institutions provide inclusive platforms for dialogue and confidence building. We are witnessing the emergence of "minilateralism" — arrangements and issue-based partnerships designed to address specific security and economic challenges.

Rather than viewing these mechanisms as competing, we should regard them as complementary. Security arrangements must contribute not only to national security, but also to regional confidence and stability.

Geopolitics plays a bigger role in regional dynamics

I will outline several key metrics that will affect and shape the geopolitics of this region to varying degrees. Globally, three important shifts are underway. The first is the logic of global economic pricing.

In the hyper-globalization era, markets were driven primarily by economic fundamentals, interest rates, inflation, employment, and fiscal and monetary policy.

Today, the world economy is entering an era of geopolitical pricing. Geopolitical risks — including war, sanctions exposure, supply chain security, sea lane communication, domestic political stability, control over strategic resources — have become essential pricing variables for major companies. These political fundamentals are increasingly important in determining the price of assets, the direction of trade, immigration of international talent, and investor confidence. Geopolitical factors are no longer a background condition but increasingly embedded in the evaluation itself.

The second shift involves the logic of military competition. From the Russia-Ukraine conflict to the US war against Iran, there has been a fundamental change in the organization of war. Warfare is entering the age of algorithms.

Unmanned systems are deployed on a large scale, artificial intelligence supports operational decisions, commercial supplies provide real-time battlefield awareness, and cyber operations are fused with kinetic force.

Military advantage is no longer defined simply by who possesses the most advanced weapons, but by who can integrate systems, process data, adapt quickly, scale affordably, and do so faster than the opponents.

The third shift concerns the logic of international order. The world once moved from Cold War bipolarity to unipolarity, and now multiple visions of order are competing simultaneously. One emphasizes the middle powers seeking great agency in shaping global governance, which I call the order of "Carneyism" after Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney.

Another points toward the sphere of influence, structured by the major powers across both geopolitical and geo-technological domains. The third reflects a transactional logic, based on deals, reciprocity, and immediate national advantages, as very passionately advocated by United States President Donald Trump.

The fourth, which is strongly supported by Beijing, is a vision of a community with a shared future for humanity, emphasizing interconnected security and long-term cooperation.

The world is entering an era in which different orders overlap, compete and coexist. The system will be layered, contested and fluid. These ongoing shifts will define the geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape ahead.

In the future, we will navigate the unfamiliar waters of how states price risks, how they organize military power, and how they position themselves in this competitive order. That is the strategic environment we must prepare for.

The views don't necessarily reflect those of China Daily.