New paths for joint progress

After more than 50 years of persistent endeavors, scientific and technological innovation will help China and Brazil build a community with a shared future

Science and technology cooperation between China and Brazil is deeply rooted in their respective development philosophies and institutional arrangements.

China has formed a sound State-led development model. Beyond conventional market regulation and overall planning, the government coordinates all stakeholders, guides capital flows and sets long-term technological development trajectories. It not only remedies market failures, but also identifies strategic priorities, defuses development risks and actively promotes industrial structural transformation. This mature governance approach to science, technology and innovation, or STI, offers important references for Brazil, which in the last decades has been struggling to legitimize the government’s role in national development.

After the debt crisis in the 1980s and especially with the advent of the so-called Washington Consensus, Brazil has shifted from a governance model where the state acts as an active development planner, industrial promoter and core driver of technological progress to a model where it retreats to a passive role limited merely to market supervision.

The Brazilian state’s governance model once observed national developmentalism. According to the tradition of Latin American structuralism, national development is a historical process of structural transformation, which can never be achieved through spontaneous market growth; it requires targeted and powerful state intervention. Technological innovation is regarded as the core engine of socioeconomic advancement, and underdevelopment cannot be eliminated by inaction or laissez-faire policies. This widely accepted viewpoint has influenced nearly all Brazilian administrations and laid the ideological groundwork for the establishment of major STI institutions, including the Brazilian Development Bank, the Funding Authority for Studies and Projects (Finep) and the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq).

Whenever Brazilian governments adopted the active development model, the country achieved remarkable progress in building independent STI capabilities. The government integrated national resources, formulated unified STI strategies and improved supporting mechanisms covering talent cultivation, research funding, technological investment and industrial application. In 1951, the Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel (CAPES) and CNPq were founded to standardize higher education and national research management. Regional research funding foundations were established nationwide, while development banks launched special technological funds to deliver stable financial support for R&D activities.

Backed by strong state support, Brazil’s scientific and technological workforce expanded rapidly in universities, research institutes and corporate R&D departments, and a complete domestic innovation ecosystem gradually took shape. By concentrating resources on key technologies and strategic industries, the state effectively broke the development constraints of peripheral economies. The government served as a vital bridge connecting basic research, applied technologies and industrial development. With consistent policies, steady investment and smooth institutional coordination, Brazil’s STI sector maintained robust momentum and marched steadily toward technological autonomy and industrial modernization. The results prove that proactive state intervention boosts STI progress in developing countries.

However, when successive governments turned to a market-oriented minimal-intervention model and confined state functions to market oversight, Brazil’s STI development suffered severe setbacks. Fiscal austerity, financial and trade liberalization, state-owned companies’ privatization and widespread deregulation meant the state lost the capacity to lead national development. The government withdrew from macro-level STI planning and industrial guidance. National layouts for key technological sectors were abandoned, and long-term R&D plans were frequently disrupted by political leadership changes. Public funding for scientific research became unstable and insufficient, hindering the progress of basic research and long-cycle technological projects.

More importantly, well-established STI institutions lost effective coordination. CAPES, CNPq, Finep and regional foundations operated in isolation without a unified governmental arrangement. Resource allocation became fragmented, and the link between research achievements and industrial application was broken. Numerous projects lacked follow-up investment and promotion, and accumulated technological advantages gradually faded away. The development of core indigenous technologies slowed markedly, severely obstructing Brazil’s pursuit of technological independence.

The whole STI system became fragmented and inefficient; uncertainties in economic and technological growth increased; and the technological gap between Brazil and global technology leaders kept widening. These demonstrate that excessive government withdrawal from STI governance does not suit Brazil’s national conditions and development stage.

Most Brazilians recognize that a large developing country cannot rely entirely on the free market to develop. Therefore, whenever the deepening of market-oriented policies leads to stagnation, calls for stronger state guidance emerge again; and the election and the current term of President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva are reflections of that.

Even so, the resilience of ideas linked to laissez-faire and this political alternation have become a prominent feature in Brazil, where a regime change may cause revised STI policies, redistributed funds and reset development priorities. This is a major obstacle to Brazil’s long-term technological breakthroughs.

China and Brazil share the common goal of technological independence and self-reliance, laying a solid foundation for bilateral STI exchanges. China has adhered to a consistent State-led innovation strategy for decades, with stable policies, continuous R&D investment and systematic industrial planning. This stable governance has enabled China to make comprehensive breakthroughs in artificial intelligence, electric vehicles, aerospace, renewable energy, digital technology, modern agriculture and biomedicine. Over the years, the two countries have carried out practical cooperation in satellite development, public health, energy and agricultural technology, with all collaboration built upon their respective STI systems.

Brazil is drawing valuable lessons from China’s experience and accomplishments in long-term strategic planning and stable policy implementation. Many local researchers and policymakers have reflected on domestic policy volatility, striving to build a balanced governance model that retains market vitality while giving full play to the state’s strengths in strategic planning, resource integration and long-term STI layout.

After more than 50 years, China and Brazil have shared hardships and celebrated achievements, moving forward side-by-side along the path of science and technology cooperation. Their partnership is anchored by a shared commitment to independence, autonomy and mutual benefit — core tenets that embody the spirit of South-South collaboration.

Looking ahead, Brazil will continue exploring a sustainable STI governance path amid debates over governing ideas. Decades of practice have proved that neither extreme laissez-faire nor disconnection between government, research institutions and industries can sustain long-term technological progress. Only by defining a stable and clear role for the state, maintaining policy continuity and linking research closely to national demands can Brazil steadily enhance its technological strength.

The two countries can further expand cooperation in emerging fields including the digital economy, AI, cloud computing and advanced manufacturing. They will build joint R&D platforms, industrial joint ventures and incubation mechanisms to accelerate the development and application of innovation outcomes, and jointly explore AI governance pathways suitable for developing nations. As major commodity trading partners, China and Brazil integrate their STI cooperation in ecological protection for the Amazon rainforest and the Brazilian Cerrado. They jointly develop low-carbon technologies and sustainable production models, and promote green trade transition and ecological conservation, offering useful experience for other Global South countries.

China and Brazil are expected to take STI as a strategic bond to deepen mutual trust, strengthen their comprehensive strategic partnership, contribute to global innovation development and jointly advance the building of a community with a shared future for humanity.

Liu Jinlong is a professor and the director at the Center for China-Brazil Civilization Exchange and Cooperation Studies at Renmin University of China. Jia Lumeng is a researcher at the center. Verena Hitner Barros is a professor at the University of Campinas and the former director of the Department of Science, Technology and Innovation Governance and Indicators at the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation of Brazil.

The authors contributed this article to China Watch, a think tank powered by China Daily. The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.

Contact the editor at editor@chinawatch.cn.