An illegal "ruling", a persistent irritant

As ten years passed since the issuing of the so-called "South China Sea arbitration award", the Philippines joined several other countries in releasing a joint statement purporting to commemorate the ruling.

These states have spoken in close coordination, casting themselves as "guardians" of international law. Yet the very need for such sustained and coordinated promotion more than a decade after the "ruling" raises an obvious question: if the "award" were unambiguously consistent with international law, would it still require this level of energetic advocacy year after year?

These coordinated declarations form a hollow chorus that cannot disguise the "award's" deeper deficiencies. China's position of non-recognition and non-acceptance of the "award", together with its rejection of any claims or actions based upon it, is firmly established in the international community.

Through sustained and detailed rebuttal, China has also made the so-called award's fundamental illegality clear to the world. Yet legal nullity has not ended its practical damage. Far from becoming irrelevant, the "award" continues to act as a persistent irritant in the South China Sea.

While it has produced no material change in China's rights and claims, it has narrowed the political space for direct negotiations, complicated maritime cooperation and crisis management, hindered the development of regional rules, and weakened confidence among States Parties in the dispute-settlement system of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. To see beyond the surrounding confusion, the "award" must be examined along three clear lines: it cannot rewrite historical facts, it cannot mask its legal errors, and it cannot offer a workable solution to present-day problems.

The illegal "award" cannot rewrite historical facts

For centuries, Chinese fishing boats, merchant vessels and official ships sailed from Chinese ports and created a living maritime space for Chinese communities in the South China Sea. They built extensive trade networks, linked coastal societies, and enabled cultural exchange across the region. Chinese historical records document these activities in detail, describe the location and features of the islands, and give them distinctive names such as Jiuru Luozhou, Shitang and Changsha.

Through this long practice, China's sovereignty over the islands and adjacent waters, as well as its historic rights in the South China Sea, took shape and were steadily reinforced by continuous and peaceful exercise. These rights predate modern international law by many centuries and rest on historical reality rather than any later legal instrument.

Western observers also recorded the same pattern of activity. In the early sixteenth century, Spanish explorer García Jofre de Loaísa noted the regular presence of large Chinese trading vessels in the Philippines. Portuguese arrivals at Malacca found numerous Chinese ships already anchored there. Seventeenth-century English traveler Thomas Herbert described how the ports of Sumatra, Borneo and Malacca came alive each January with fleets of Chinese merchant vessels.

In the early twentieth century, Western colonial powers showed interest in the islands but met firm opposition from both the Chinese government and public. During World War II, Japan occupied most of the features as part of its southward strategy. After Japan's defeat, China sent naval vessels to the Xisha and Nansha islands in late 1946 to reassert sovereignty through formal ceremonies and the re-erection of markers.

In 1947 the Chinese government standardized the names of the islands and published the Location Map of the South China Sea Islands, which included the dashed line. The chain of sovereignty was never broken; it was strengthened by concrete state action and widespread international recognition.

Post-war legal instruments confirm this continuity. The Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation required Japan to return territories it had taken from China and set the principles for restoring justice after aggression. For years after 1945, the United States itself acknowledged Chinese sovereignty over the Nansha Islands through diplomatic correspondence, survey requests and notifications of planned flights and voyages.

Decades ago, the Philippines occupied certain Nansha features. More than a decade ago, it launched unilateral "arbitration" in an attempt to legitimize and expand those occupations. Today, the Philippines and some external actors continue to invoke the "award" in various forms. None of these efforts can alter the historical record. China's sovereignty over the islands rests on centuries of practice and the post-war settlement; it will not be redirected by political pressure or an unlawful ruling.

The illegal "award" cannot qualify as international law

Almost every stage of the so-called arbitration — from the framing of the claims to the final conclusions — contains serious legal defects. The problem lies not only in the result but in the manner in which it was reached. The process itself mocked the standards of international adjudication.

The tribunal's composition raised immediate questions of impartiality. Most members were appointed by then-President of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Shunji Yanai of Japan, whose domestic political activities included advocating for loosening post-war security constraints. Months before the "award" appeared, a United States government report on China's maritime claims supplied the tribunal with ready-made arguments on the nine-dash line and historic rights.

During the proceedings, some arbitrators and expert witnesses departed from positions they had maintained for years. Even before the "award" was delivered, certain states and commentators publicly demanded that China "comply with" it. The entire exercise was a politically driven proceeding dressed in legal form.

Substantively, the "award" failed on three counts. It mischaracterized territorial disputes as questions of Convention interpretation and application, then proceeded to address sovereignty — an issue clearly outside its mandate. It treated the Convention as the sole source of maritime rights and dismissed historic rights and the integrity of offshore archipelagic features that rest on general international law.

Finally, instead of clarifying rules or facilitating settlement, the "award" has made practical resolution more difficult, undermined the Convention's character as a balanced package deal, and damaged confidence in its dispute-settlement procedures.

China's rejection of the "award" and of any claims derived from it is directed not at the Convention itself but at the abuse of its mechanisms to encroach on sovereign rights. The aim is precisely to preserve the Convention's integrity and authority.

In recent years, growing numbers of international scholars have voiced similar concerns about jurisdictional overreach, questionable interpretive methods and the uncertain effects of the "award" on coastal-state rights. These reflections show that sustained critique has had an effect: more observers now recognize the so-called award's procedural and substantive shortcomings.

The illegal "award" cannot resolve real-world problems

The record of China–Philippines relations and the situation at sea shows that the "award" has not settled disputes; it has generated new complications.

The "award" was issued after China refused to participate and despite its clear opposition. This raises a basic question: can a compulsory third-party procedure that lacks the consent of a party truly reflect the design of the Convention's dispute-settlement system? Packaging territorial and delimitation issues as pure questions of Convention interpretation and forcing them into judicial channels does not align with the practical character of the disputes.

Because the "award" originated in political calculation wrapped in legal language, it has struggled to gain genuine traction. Repeated public endorsements by external powers are themselves evidence of weakness; a ruling of real authority would not require annual political resuscitation. Such support only highlights the so-called award's instrumental character.

For the Philippines, three steps are required. First, the belief that a single arbitral decision or renewed litigation can settle complex historical and sovereignty questions must be abandoned; experience has shown this path leads nowhere. Second, reliance on external actors to constrain China's legitimate activities only raises tensions and risks turning the South China Sea into an arena of major-power rivalry, harming regional stability and development. Third, practical cooperation in non-sensitive areas — joint fisheries management, environmental protection, search and rescue, and marine scientific research — offers immediate benefits and can build the conditions for addressing harder issues later.

For states not directly involved, the sensible approach is to set aside geopolitical framing and assess China's position in light of its development goals, diplomatic priorities, security perceptions and consistent practice. They should view China's territorial sovereignty and maritime rights, and its preference for direct negotiation between the parties concerned, against the background of established international law and the full corpus of the law of the sea.

This would return the issue to its proper setting — historical fact, recognized legal principles and dialogue between the states directly concerned — free from external interference, and allowing progress through mutual respect and equal consultation.

The author is the director of the Center for International and Regional Studies, National Institute for South China Sea Studies.

The views don't necessarily reflect those of China Daily.

If you have a specific expertise, or would like to share your thought about our stories, then send us your writings at opinion@chinadaily.com.cn, and comment@chinadaily.com.cn.