New discourse to uphold multilateralism
While the US’ withdrawals from multilateral organizations upset world cooperation, China will continue to contribute to global governance through initiatives
The United States announced on Jan 7 its withdrawals from 66 international organizations that “no longer serve American interests”, 31 of them being the United Nations bodies. Although the US’ withdrawals from multilateral institutions are nothing new, the scale of this move is unprecedented and carries far-reaching implications for global governance and the international order.
The withdrawals reflect deliberate strategic planning. The 66 organizations were identified through a comprehensive review mandated by President Donald Trump’s Executive Order 14199. Each decision was shaped by a mix of strategic calculation and political considerations to serve the “America First” agenda.
Moreover, unlike earlier withdrawals that were confined to a single domain, the organizations that have been hit this time cut across a wide range of core areas of global governance, such as climate change, human rights and cultural cooperation. Therefore, the withdrawals this time will have far-reaching and complex implications for the multilateral system.
By withdrawing from international organizations, the US is not abandoning global governance, but seeking to redefine its role within it.
One objective is to concentrate power in a handful of priority domains. Consistent with its national security strategy, the Trump administration seeks selective engagement in global governance to sharply reduce investment in non-strategic areas while preserving dominance in the global economy, advanced technology and military security.
Another aim is to minimize constraints and advance unilateral hegemony. By systematically dismantling the existing global system and exerting pressure in international interactions, Washington seeks fewer institutional checks and greater freedom of action to force through its agenda unilaterally.
A third goal is to scale back investment in global governance. The US increasingly evaluates global engagement through a cost-benefit lens and reshapes its global role accordingly. Continued cuts to funding for international organizations are intended to reduce external burdens, reflecting a utilitarian approach.
Following the sweeping US withdrawals, the global governance system and the international order will face more challenges.
The foundations of the global governance structure have been eroded. The US’ exit from UN-related bodies and mechanisms such as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change has disrupted the existing global system and weakened the authority and effectiveness of multilateral mechanisms, pushing the UN-centered governance structure into a crisis of trust.
The withdrawals have also weakened global coordination and deepened fragmentation in global governance. Cooperation in climate action, public health and security has been disrupted, leading to the under-provision of global public goods, stalled regional collaboration and rising difficulties in policy alignment. As a result, global governance will become ever more divided.
The US’ withdrawals from multilateral organizations as a tool for power politics and selective application of rules to suit its interests have deepened divisions. Global cooperation also faces the risk of being steered away from the principles of extensive consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits.
In response to this, the international community must build consensus and act collectively. China, for its part, will continue to contribute to global governance through global initiatives.
First, the central role of multilateral institutions can be strengthened. By upholding the UN as the core platform of global governance, China has put forward four global initiatives — the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, the Global Civilization Initiative and the Global Governance Initiative — to offer Chinese solutions to the world. On this basis, China can further advocate improved decision-making and financial mechanisms to ensure continuity on critical agendas. Reforming these institutions will allow China to deepen cooperation with other Global South countries, amplify the voice of developing nations and help address long-standing imbalances in Western-dominated governance. China can also use multilateral platforms to promote the enforcement of international law, establish multilateral mechanisms to ensure compliance and bolster resilience against unilateralism.
Second, more diversified and coordinated cooperation networks can be built. Linkages can be deepened among regional mechanisms such as BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, creating synergies through policy coordination, resource sharing and mutual recognition of outcomes. Furthermore, China will continue to leverage the Belt and Road Initiative to align national development strategies with regional cooperation plans. At the same time, emerging economies and developing states can be encouraged to develop new forms of multilateral cooperation to strengthen cross-regional resilience.
Third, a global consensus for collective action should be reached. Global issues can be prioritized to foster broad-based cooperation. In climate governance, China will continue to uphold the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities to advance more inclusive implementation pathways. In public healthcare and food security, it is essential to build global platforms to facilitate technology exchanges, joint responses to emergencies and coordination on raw resources. Moreover, China can also work to promote a new discourse on global governance, to ensure equity, justice and shared responsibility are embedded in rule-making. This is key to upholding multilateralism, building consensus to address global challenges and injecting certainty into global governance.
The author is the director of the Institute of American Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations.
The author contributed this article to China Watch, a think tank powered by China Daily. The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.
Contact the editor at editor@chinawatch.cn.
































