Foreign ministers of the United States, Britain, France, Russia and China, which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, plus their German counterpart, decided on July 12 that the Iranian nuclear issue should be reported to the UN Security Council. The six countries made the decision because Iran failed to positively respond to the package of incentives and proposals worked out by the six parties early last month to resolve the country's nuclear issue.

The foreign ministers said in a statement that they would see to it that the Security Council passes a resolution giving binding power to the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) demand that Iran suspend its uranium enrichment activities. Corresponding measures would be taken on the basis of Article 41 in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, in case Iran refuses to comply with the resolution.

The package of incentives and proposals to resolve Iran's nuclear issue was drafted by the European Union and approved by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and the German foreign minister on June 2 in Vienna. It is also known as P5+1 proposed package.

Javier Solana, the EU foreign policy chief, formally delivered the package to Iran on June 6. But its contents were withheld from the public at that time.

The UN Security Council revealed the contents of the plan on July 13.

The proposals suggest that if Iran agrees to suspend its uranium enrichment activities, the international community would support the nation's development of a nuclear programme for civilian purposes as allowed by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

There are other incentives.

Euratom (the European Atomic Energy Community), for instance, would sign a nuclear co-operation accord with Iran, offering the latter state-of-the-art technology to build light-water reactors in the country.

In addition, Iran would be offered membership of the Enrichment Facility in Russia. The centre would enrich all the UF6 (uranium hexafluoride) turned out by Iran's uranium conversion facilities and dispose of the country's nuclear waste.

With the participation of Iran, a buffer stock would be set up to provide the nation with enough nuclear fuel to sustain it for five years.

At the same time, the international community would support Iran's membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and work to see the lifting of the ban on selling passenger planes to Iran. The European Union would build a long-term strategic energy partnership with Iran and help the latter to develop energy infrastructure such as gas and oil pipelines.

The relevant parties would also encourage the introduction of a regional forum aimed at promoting security in the Gulf region and support the goal of making the Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their vehicles.

However, the P5+1 proposals state that measures would be taken against Iran, in accordance with Article 41 in Chapter VII of the UN Charter, if Iran refuses to co-operate with the international community in this regard. The measures include prohibiting overseas tours by top Iranian officials and personnel related to the nuclear programme, freezing the assets of Iranian organizations and individuals involved in the nuclear programme, imposing an arms embargo and refraining from supporting Iran's WTO membership.

Iran, after being presented with the P5+1 package, said that the new plan offered something positive but some technical details had yet to be clarified. So a definite and substantial reply to the package would be made only after careful studies were conducted. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, after prodding from the United States and other Western countries, declared that Iran would make the formal response to the package before August 22.

Some incentives offered in the P5+1 package are indeed ambiguously defined, viewed from the technical perspective.

For example, the P5+1 plan allows Iran to retain its uranium conversion capability, using centrifuges to turn uranium ore into UF6 which contains 0.75 per cent of uranium. The UF6 substance thus acquired is supposed to be turned into enriched uranium by Russia. A question arises here. Should all of Iran's 164 centrifuges be engaged in the processing of uranium ore into UF6? Furthermore, should Iran be allowed to buy or produce more centrifuges for this purpose?

In addition, the P5+1 plan demands that Iran suspend all uranium-enrichment related activities. Interpretation of the word "suspend" varies according to the different parties involved. Russia, for example, maintains that the P5+1 package is aimed at helping Iran establish its credibility in the international community, believing that Iran embarked on the nuclear programme for purely peaceful purposes. So, according to Russia, the word "suspend" has a time frame. In eight or 10 years time, Iran can, therefore, resume its own uranium enrichment activities once the country's credibility is established in the international community.

The United States and Britain, however, have a different interpretation. They maintain that, in this case, "suspension" is permanent. So Iran should stop all its uranium enrichment activities once and for all. France and Germany are caught between these two different schools of opinion.

Disagreement also arises from the understanding of the P5+1 package's goals of bringing about a WMD-free Middle East.

Iran, which is a signatory to the NPT and has time and again stated that possession of nuclear weapons goes against Islamic tradition, complains about the double standards adopted by Western countries. The West, for instance, turns a blind eye to Israel's possession and storage of nuclear weapons while pressurizing Iran to abandon its nuclear programme. The West, therefore, has an interest only in the mirage-like goals of bringing about a WMD-free Middle East but refrains from pushing Israel to sign the NPT.

Other examples can be cited to illustrate Iran's concern about the real connotations of the incentives contained in the P5+1 proposals.

All in all, however, the core of the P5+1 package is about Iran suspending its uranium enrichment activities and fully co-operating with the IAEA in this regard, which means that the country should resume the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement. On this basis, Iran can negotiate with relevant parties on the incentives contained in the package and thereafter reach a long-term co-operative accord.

In other words, Iran's suspension of its uranium enrichment constitutes the prerequisite to really enjoying the incentives offered by the P5+1 plan. Once the negotiations on settling the Iranian nuclear issue are resumed, Iran will be able to have discussions with the relevant parties to clarify the ambiguities with regard to the incentives and can even bargain hard.

Iran is not supposed to turn down the P5+1 proposals, citing technical ambiguities, and then refuse to come back to the negotiating table and continue its uranium enrichment.

Iran's resumption of uranium enrichment in August 2005 caused great concern in its immediate neighbourhood and the international community as a whole. The P5+1 plan now offers a golden opportunity to settle the nuclear issue. It is better for Iran to respond to the proposals positively as soon as possible.

The author is a professor with China Foreign Affairs University.

(China Daily 07/17/2006 page4)