The economic relationship between the United States and China could well be 
the world's most important bilateral relationship of the 21st century. And it's 
not going well. The stresses and strains of globalization have added 
considerable tension to the interplay.
The risks of trade frictions and protectionist actions are mounting. Perhaps 
more importantly, a corrosive sense of mistrust is building between the United 
States and China that if left unattended could result in both nations, to say 
nothing of the broader global economy, squandering enormous opportunities in the 
years ahead. It's time for a wake-up call before it's too late.
The United States is flirting with protectionism at a time when its need for 
foreign capital has never been greater. At work is a highly combustible mixture 
of macro and politics. America's saving shortfall has led to a massive trade 
deficit, and China happens to account for the biggest portion of that deficit. 
Meanwhile, a growing sense of angst has gripped the middle-class American 
workers. This has triggered a classic political blame game, with China being 
increasingly singled out as the scapegoat. The drumbeat of China bashing is 
growing louder and louder.
There is a very simple and extremely powerful macro point that is being 
overlooked in this debate: America no longer has the internal wherewithal to 
fund the rapid growth of its economy. Suffering from the greatest domestic 
saving shortfall in modern history, the United States is increasingly dependent 
on surplus foreign saving to fill the void. The net national saving rate the 
combined saving of individuals, businesses, and the government sector after 
adjusting for depreciation fell into negative territory to the tune of -1.2 per 
cent of national income in late 2005. That means America doesn't save enough 
even to cover the replacement of its worn-out capital stock. This is a first for 
the United States in the modern post-World War II era, and I believe a first for 
any great power over a much longer sweep of world history.
Faced with a shortfall of domestic saving, countries basically have two 
choices to curtail economic growth or borrow from the rest of the world. The 
first option just doesn't cut it in the land of abundance.
America, in general, and its consumers, in particular, treat rapid economic 
growth as an entitlement. That leaves the United States with little choice other 
than to pursue the second option - drawing heavily on the global saving pool in 
order to fund economic growth. Once the United States started down the slippery 
path of consuming beyond its internal means, it got harder and harder to break 
the habit. Ironically, it has become exceedingly difficult for Washington to 
accept the consequences of that habit - a nation that has become beholden both 
to external funding and production. And yet that's exactly how China fits into 
America's macro equation.
That underscores a key attribute of the savings-short, deficit nation: It is 
forced to run current account deficits in order to attract the requisite foreign 
capital. And in the case of the United States, where external funding needs are 
so massive - now closing in on US$800 billion per year, or about US$3 billion 
per business day - most of the current account imbalance shows up in the form of 
a huge trade deficit. In 2005, the trade deficit in goods and services accounted 
for fully 93 per cent of the total current-account gap.
With that external funding imperative come key geopolitical tradeoffs. Thanks 
to China, America actually got a rather extraordinary deal for its trade deficit 
dollar in 2005 a net balance of some US$200 billion of low-cost, high-quality 
Chinese goods that expanded the purchasing power of US consumers. If, however, 
Washington politicians now choose to close down trade with China by imposing 
high tariffs or forcing a major Chinese currency revaluation - precisely the 
intent of legislation proposed by US Senators Schumer and Graham - those actions 
could easily backfire.
Remove the China supply line, and the trade deficit for a saving-short US 
economy won't shrink as populist politicians suggest. Instead, due to America's 
oversized external funding needs, the trade deficit would remain large and 
merely gravitate to another foreign producer - most likely, one with a higher 
cost structure. Such a shift in America's external sourcing would amount to the 
functional equivalent of a tax on the American consumer.
The current political boil raises a critical question: Can a savings-short US 
select its lenders as well as dictate the terms of its external financing needs? 
The simple answer to the first part of the question is, "yes" - targeted 
protectionist actions can, indeed, redirect the sources of external commerce and 
funding.
Through the Schumer-Graham tariffs, the US could tilt the mix of its trade 
patterns away from China.
Such actions would do nothing, however, to address the basic problem. As long 
as the US economy is locked on a sub-par domestic saving path, it is hooked 
increasingly on the "kindness of strangers" to provide the sustenance of its 
economic growth - both in terms of foreign-made goods as well as financial 
capital.
Country-specific protectionist actions would "succeed" only in shifting 
America's trade deficit and concomitant capital surplus elsewhere in the world.
There's an even darker side to the recent protectionist backlash in the 
United States - the crass politics of scapegoating. The ongoing angst of 
middle-class American workers has become a political football -even with the 
national unemployment rate below 5 per cent. It's not hard to figure out why. A 
US labour market that was once trapped in a jobless recovery is now mired in a 
wageless recovery - generating an extraordinary stagnation of real wages even in 
the face of strong productivity growth. At the same time, the United States is 
suffering from a record trade deficit, whose largest bilateral piece is with 
China. That's all it takes for politicians to point the finger at China as being 
responsible for the trade-related pressures bearing down on beleaguered US 
workers. With mid-term elections looming in the United States, I suspect this 
protectionist posturing could well intensify in the months ahead.
But who is really to blame in all this? At the end of the day, America's 
saving shortfall - the origin of potentially destabilizing capital and trade 
flows - is a by-product of conscious choices made by the US body politic. The 
Federal budget deficit, which has accounted for the bulk of the plunge in 
national saving over the past six years, is made in Washington not in Beijing. 
The negative personal saving rate is partly an outgrowth of pro-consumption tax 
policies again, made in Washington. America's elected representatives are the 
source of resistance to tax reforms, such as a consumption tax, that might 
address the deficiencies of private saving. Of course, politicians never want to 
admit that they are the problem.
Instead, they prefer to pin the blame on others in this case, China. Or 
Dubai, in the case of the recent political firestorm over its proposed 
acquisition of East Coast shipping facilities.
Meanwhile, the United States does next to nothing to shoulder its share of 
the problem a staggering shortfall of domestic savings. Such political posturing 
is a recipe for serious trouble, in my view.
The author is Chief Economist at Morgan Stanley. This 
is an excerpt from his speech at the China Development Forum in Beijing on March 
19-20 
 
(China Daily 03/23/2006 page4)