This year will see momentous decisions about Hong Kong's future. The consultations about constitutional change which commenced in early December will be completed, and options considered for what selection procedure will be used for the key position of the Chief Executive (CE). One possible outcome might be universal franchise amongst all residents of Hong Kong for their leader. Something that the British never achieved in over a century of colonial rule of the region will have come to pass - democracy in Hong Kong. The irony of this happening long after British rule has ended will not be lost on many observers.

The weight on Hong Kong has never been greater. Three CEs have served since 1997, but none achieved a full two terms. The reasons for this are mixed. But for each of them, including the current incumbent, the road has been hard. Hong Kong is many things, but it seems, at least on this score, not to be an easy place to administer and remain popular in. Tung Chee-hwa, Donald Tsang and Leung Chun-ying all have relatively low public approvals during their period in charge, Leung distressingly early. He has had, uniquely, no honeymoon in his position. Hong Kong people are tough customers towards their politicians.

Perhaps this will be solved by giving more people a direct say in who is appointed CE. Creating a stronger sense of participation in decision-making is important in any place. The public gets irritated when they know decisions about their future are being made in rooms they have no access to by people who claim they are doing things for their benefit but not giving them a say. The best this produces is disengagement and cynicism. The worst is total revolt. Hong Kong is not yet anywhere close to a critical stage, but the position of the CE, for all its political and symbolic importance, needs to be revived and made central to people's lives - a person they can invest emotional capital in and feel supported and represented by.

It is far from Beijing's interests to see Hong Kong's confidence as a society and economy fall. Despite all the speculation about the future competition from Shanghai, there is little sense for the leaders of the People's Republic to want to see such a major asset as Hong Kong affected negatively. Even in the period when the ideology on the mainland was hard-line Maoism, with a publicly stated visceral antagonism to Western capitalism, Hong Kong was regarded by leaders such as Zhou Enlai as an asset - a key portal to the rest of the world for trade and communication, and somewhere they were willing to accept the status quo until the expiry of some of the leases forced on China over a century before came due.

In the second decade of the 21st century China has adopted an indigenous, hybrid form of market socialism since 1992, and in other iterations "socialism with Chinese characteristics". So Hong Kong has a very secure and defined space in this. Its importance as a rules-based, stable international center for capital and business is a vast asset to the region, and to China itself. While Shanghai may function increasingly in the future as a finance center for the country's vast domestic market, Hong Kong's international role is long established, well functioning and robust. To act against this would be senseless and is not something Beijing would do.

But nor is it likely that the central leadership in Beijing will want to see a system adopted in Hong Kong that will lead to the sort of paralysis being experienced between the executive and the legislature in the US, or in other democratic systems. They will be suspicious of any attempts to push the system in Hong Kong towards what they will regard as loaded and alien systems that will be sources of attack on their own legitimacy. Like it or not, the Beijing views are also part of the calculations being made by stakeholders in Hong Kong. After all, as a special administrative region of a sovereign nation, it is in no one's interests to come up with a proposal that will end up angering the entity your final legal basis is dependent on.

Hong Kong has the responsibility now to spell out something between these two poles. On the one hand, something that is more representative and workable than the interim system that currently exists for selection. But on the other hand, something that also gets the support and confidence of key stakeholders. All of this is helped by one important fact - that a system that the people of Hong Kong are not happy with is one that no one else will be happy with too. So Hong Kong now has to articulate clearly what it wants and how to get there. This is a truly momentous decision, and one that it is making not just for itself, but for the country it is part of because of the huge symbolic importance Hong Kong's decision will have.

The author is executive director of China Studies Center and professor of Chinese Politics at University of Sydney; team leader of the Europe China Research and Advice Network (ECRAN) funded by the European Union; and associate fellow at Chatham House, London.

(HK Edition 01/03/2014 page9)