Hedging strategy won't do relationship good Xue FukangChina Daily Updated: 2005-11-21 06:00
On September 21, the US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick delivered a
speech, entitled "Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility," at the
National Committee on US-China Relations in New York.
I think highly of this speech for three reasons.
First, it clearly demonstrates that President George W. Bush is in firm
command of the US policy towards China, and would not hesitate to take the lead
in steering the debate on US-China relations onto the right track. The content
of Zoellick's speech indicates that President Bush, just as the previous six US
presidents, simply does not buy into the conservative idea of confronting China
and pursuing a more aggressive containment policy. The administration believes
the national interests of the United States can be better served by integrating
China so it is a full member of the international system.
Second, the Bush administration explicitly recognizes that the "China of
today is simply not the Soviet Union of the late 1940s: it does not seek to
spread radical, anti-American ideologies; it does not see itself in a twilight
conflict against democracy around the globe. It does not see itself in a death
struggle with capitalism; it does not seek to overturn the fundamental order of
the international system." This judgment translates into prerequisites for the
two great powers to develop a more co-operative relationship in order to
successfully cope with the wide range of global challenges in the years ahead. I
think this is one of the most important conclusions that the Bush administration
has come to in the face of the "China threat" chorus.
Third, the United States has for the first time publicly treated China as a
"stakeholder" in the international system, and invited China to play a more
important role in strengthening the system. It is another way of recognizing
China's enhanced status and sees it as a more valuable partner.
The tone of Zoellick's speech is essentially positive and will play a key
role in making a more constructive relationship between the two countries in the
years to come. With that prospect in mind, I believe the significance of
Zoellick's speech has yet to be fully appreciated.
Having said that, I could not but comment on another concept that Zoellick
brought into the US policy towards China the Hedging Strategy. He said, "For the
United States and the world, the essential question is how will China use its
influence?" "Uncertainties about how China will use its power will lead the
United States and others as well to hedge relations with China."
I have a few thoughts on this hedging strategy:
To abandon the phrase "containment" and introduce instead the concept
"hedging relations" in US policy towards China will direct the American people's
attention more to the constructive side and less to the containment side. It
should improve the general atmosphere in bilateral relations. But this "hedging
Strategy" is in essence not much different from the "congagement"
(containment-engagement) strategy. The United States will continue to employ all
the available means economic, scientific, cultural, diplomatic and especially
military instruments to prevent China from rising "too rapidly" and becoming a
challenger of the US primacy. Therefore, I don't see Zoellic's speech as a
significant shift of US China policy away from congagement strategy.
With the "hedging strategy" in place, the US policy towards China is a
"paradoxical unity of opposites." The intensity of hedging decides the degree of
sincerity in developing co-operative relations with China. The necessity of
co-operation may have to give way to the necessity of containment. The "China
threat" school will have their say now and then. The US-China relationship will
most probably remain "neither too bad nor too good," full of ups and downs.
Neither country will be able to reap the best results from restrained
co-operation.
Hedging relations is definitely not in China's interests, and it is not in
the United States' interests either. The hedging strategy has costs. It will
take up enormous resources which could be used in a more productive way. Hedging
will offset future risks but when it is found out there has been no such risk at
all, much of the resources allocated to it will be wasted, and many
opportunities missed. Therefore, US policy makers will have to negotiate among
themselves the crucial question: Will China really become a threat or a
challenge to the United States' primacy?
The evidences repudiating the notion of the "China threat" abound. I would
just draw American policy-makers' attention to the following three basic facts
which represent the prerequisites for any challenger to US primacy to emerge:
(1) China has no such strategic plan;
(2) China won't be able to gain such capabilities in the foreseeable future;
(3) There won't be such an international environment given the development of
globalization and multi-polarization.
But if not China, then who? Sooner or later, the decline of US primacy is
inevitable; history has taught us so. My advice is: Uncle Sam, watch the rapid
development of globalization and multi-polarization. They will gradually bring
to the world a new democratic international system which would welcome no
primacy at all. Hence the United States might be the last primacy in human
history and it really need not worry about the emergence of any potential
challenger.
If policy-makers can overcome this "China threat syndrome," we will
definitely see a new horizon for US-China relations in the years to come.
The author is a senior fellow at the China Reform
Forum
(China Daily 11/21/2005 page4)
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