US should recall 1930 when considering China tariffs William Peseknull Updated: 2005-06-09 09:13
In the battle between the United States and China over the yuan, all eyes are
on Beijing. It may make more sense to look to the U.S. state of Iowa, more
specifically, to its Republican senator, Charles Grassley.
What has been lost in the escalating tit for tat over China's currency peg is
the economics of the issue. For a reminder of what's at stake, U.S. lawmakers
should consider comments that Grassley made in an April 26 Bloomberg News
interview.
Asked why he wasn't supporting a proposed 27.5 percent tariff on Chinese
imports unless Beijing relaxed the yuan's 8.3 peg to the dollar, Grassley said,
"I saw it as an opening of the doors for Smoot-Hawley."
The reference here is to a congressional move in 1930 that raised tariffs on
imported goods by as much as 60 percent. Other nations, of course, followed
suit, imposing retaliatory tariffs. It was perhaps the last thing the global
economy needed on the heels of 1929's stock-market crash.
"You know, when you talk about a 27 percent tariff if a country doesn't do
something the way we want them to do it, then, you know, that's what we did with
Smoot-Hawley in 1930, and that brought on the Great Depression," said Grassley,
whose state was hit hard by those tariffs. "Protectionism would be started by
the United States, not ended by the United States. So we got to find some other
way of doing it."
The magnitude of the fallout from the Smoot-Hawley Act is debatable.
Arguments by supply-side-economics enthusiasts that it caused the Great
Depression ignore the Federal Reserve's culpability in the most infamous U.S.
boom-and-bust cycle. Still, taking steps that hurt farmers and curtailed
international trade hardly helped.
All this should offer a cautionary tale to U.S. lawmakers looking ahead to
their next election. As we see with each passing day, threats from U.S. senators
like Charles Schumer of New York and Lindsey Graham of South Carolina - who
sponsored the China tariff legislation - are falling flat in Beijing.
If they are wondering why, they need only read recent comments by Deputy
Finance Minister Lou Jiwei. China Business News quoted Lou as saying that his
country wasn't yet ready for a floating currency and that the timing of even
small changes to the peg should be left to the best judgment of Chinese
officials.
Warnings of trade sanctions leave China less willing to let the yuan rise in
the near term. They also show how little leverage the once mighty U.S. Treasury
Department has over officials in Beijing.
The intractableness of China's position may reflect not stubbornness but real
concerns about the underlying state of Asia's No. 2 economy.
One barometer of China's challenges is its stock markets. While stock indexes
don't always correlate with gross domestic product, how could the Shanghai
Composite Index be down more than 18 percent this year amid 9 percent growth?
The explanation goes beyond inadequate corporate transparency and governance.
One also has to look at China's rickety financial system, which is weighed down
by hundreds of billions of dollars of bad loans. There's also reason to worry
about the viability of more recent loans that could turn bad amid efforts to
slow the economy.
One concern is that some, or much, of the 20 percent increase in bank lending
in each of the past two years was directed by government officials into
unprofitable state-owned enterprises. Another concern is a steady increase in
consumer credit in a nation unaccustomed to managing debt.
All this can be seen in the plans of Bank of Communications, which is seeking
to raise as much as 14.9 billion Hong Kong dollars, or about $1.9 billion, in
the first of three overseas share sales by China's banks this year.
Bank of Communications, the fifth-largest Chinese lender, is offering the
shares at a lower valuation than the biggest banks in Hong Kong thanks to
concerns about the nation's nonperforming loans, said Christopher Wong at
Aberdeen Asset Management in Singapore.
Until China's financial system is ready for prime time, it may leave its
currency peg alone. That underscores the futility of tariffs. No one is saying
that China is in full compliance with its World Trade Organization
responsibilities, yet there is a risk of unintended consequences from attaching
trade penalties to currency values.
The most obvious one is a trade war that leads to a kind of tariff arms race
between the United States, China and Europe. China would certainly retaliate,
upping the stakes elsewhere.
Given the interconnectedness of the global economy today - the United States
needs cheap Chinese goods and for China to buy more U.S. Treasuries, for
example, and China needs U.S. demand - it's in no one's best interest, least of
all American corporations relying more and more on cheap Chinese labor to fatten
profit margins.
It's odd, really. In Washington, the belief seems to be that China is
exploiting U.S. workers, when it is really their employers exploiting Chinese's
ample supply of low-wage laborers.
Bottom line, there's arguably no greater risk to U.S. corporate earnings and
hiring activity than problems with the U.S.'s commercial ties with China.
It's fine to deal with trade disputes. Yet, as Iowa's
Grassley points out, knee-jerk protectionism of the kind making the rounds on
Capitol Hill isn't the answer. By punishing China for its currency stance,
Congress may just be cooking up a new and improved Smoot-Hawley debacle.
The above content represents the view of the author
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