Policy adjusted to meet changes
China Daily  Updated: 2005-04-19 07:01

Editor's Note: At a seminar sponsored by China Daily last week, leading researchers on Taiwan studies analyzed the current cross-Straits situation and gave their opinions on the future development of bilateral ties. The following are some of their thoughts.

Principle and consistency have long been two of the defining features of Beijing's Taiwan policy. Undoubtedly, policy-makers in Beijing have been making adjustments in reaction to changes in the international landscape as well as political shifts in Taiwan and cross-Straits relations.

Some of these adjustments were too subtle and nuanced to be perceived by outside watchers. But such adjustments have become more quick-paced, vigorous and flexible since President Hu Jintao took office two years ago.

Two salient characteristics stand out:

First, there has been a strategic shift from "timetable for reunification" to "opposing secessionism as top priority."

The Chinese mainland has always proposed "opposing secessionism to promote reunification" and regarded it as two sides of the same coin. In other words, they complement each other: Promoting reunification is the best way to curb secessionism and to fend off secessionism one must promote reunification.

The more Taiwan leans towards secession, the more urgent the mainland feels the need to do something, which has in turn led to the notions of "timetable for reunification" and "intolerance of indefinite procrastination."

In the past two years, Beijing has started to distinguish between "opposing secessionism" and "promoting reunification" and see them as two strategically interrelated, but tactically disparate goals. "Opposition to secessionism" is meant to maintain the status quo (which Beijing defines as "both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one and the same China") and to prevent secessionist forces in Taiwan from proclaiming "de jure independence," which would jeopardize cross-Straits peace and stability.

Compared with the far more complex and difficult task of reunification, it will be relatively easy to accomplish the goal of "opposing secessionism." That is because as long as the Taiwan authorities officially agree to Beijing's definition of the status quo, that goal will be achieved despite the continued presence of secessionist forces in Taiwan.

International reaction will also vary: Countries like the United States do not support Taiwan secessionism, but are by no means enthusiastic about reunification efforts by the mainland.

Distinguishing between the two goals has led to a new consensus among policy-makers in Beijing: The top priority in the foreseeable future is to curb secessionism. Last year, the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council released its historical "May 17 Statement."

This begins by asserting, "Presently, the most pressing task facing compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Straits is to resolutely curb Taiwanese secessionist activities, which aims to split China, so as to maintain cross-Straits peace and stability." This is the first time in history that Beijing has explicitly referred to "opposing secessionism" as the "most pressing task" in its Taiwan policy statements.

Demonstrating the new emphasis is the recently promulgated Anti-Secession Law. Although it sets reunification as the direction and the ultimate goal, its focus is on how to check the radical secessionist elements while seeking as much support as possible from other segments of Taiwanese society.

Meanwhile, lively debates about the "reunification timetable" have, in the past two years, been giving way to buzzwords like "seizing strategic opportunities." On November 14, 2004, President Hu Jintao, in a meeting with Chinese-Brazilians during his Latin America tour, pointed out that "the rise of China and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation depend on development first and reunification second." This marks a notable departure from erstwhile urgency towards reunification and demonstrates that, from the perspective of the current leadership, development is the sole and ultimate key to the resolution of the Taiwan issue.

It must be noted, however, that "opposing secessionism first" does not mean relinquishing the goal of reunification; rather, it means policy-makers have taken a longer-term view. In practice, this means Beijing's Taiwan policy has developed a more nuanced approach towards accommodating the interests of Taiwanese people and the conducting of cross-Straits negotiations.

The second main point is that the "non-peaceful" alternative should be the last resort.

In the run-up to Taiwan's 2004 "presidential" campaign, Chen Shui-bian's secessionist rhetoric and provocation soared to unprecedented heights. The challenge of Taiwanese secessionism was more "pressing" than ever, while all "peaceful means" to cope with it were being exhausted.

Under this background, the word "bottom line" was frequently used in the autumn of 2003 by mainland media in their reporting on Taiwan. By the end of that year, Chen Shui-bian had openly proposed a "timetable for independence" and had, despite strong objections from the United States, decided to hold a "referendum" alongside the elections. Beijing was seized with an acute awareness that the situation might well spiral out of control and this, in turn, prompted the leadership to push for the Anti-Secession Law. For all intents and purposes, it is precisely the upsurge in Taiwan secessionism that necessitated this law.

By March 2005, when the law was officially promulgated, tension across the Straits had begun to ease, and the mainland thus put more emphasis on the peaceful elements of the law. However, there is no denying that the law was intended to send a stern warning to secessionist forces and it was just the section about the employment of non-peaceful means that caught outside attention.

With my analysis of this section as well as President Hu Jintao's March 4 speech on the Taiwan issue during the National People's Congress session, I found some interesting points.

First, "the use of force" is no longer an empty threat. There are at least two points in the law that had never been publicized before, namely: The State Council and the Central Military Commission are specifically charged with "deciding on and executing" non-peaceful action; and the legitimate rights and interests of Taiwan civilians and foreign nationals in Taiwan would be protected in case of war. Unlike previous propaganda campaigns or military exercises conducted by the mainland, this law constitutes a concrete step towards war preparations in case of the crossing of the "bottom line" by Taiwan secessionist forces.

If Chen Shui-bian persists in moving towards "de jure independence," the mainland would, in all likelihood, resort to "non-peaceful means." Indeed, no one should underestimate China's determination to safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity. If war is the price for doing that, China is willing to pay such a price.

Second, "the use of force" is defined as strictly "a last resort." The law specifies three scenarios in which the "bottom line" is crossed and use of force hence authorized; yet none of the three could be triggered by the mainland. In other words, it is only if "Taiwan independence" becomes a fait accompli that "non-peaceful means" will be employed. Thus, the law is merely a mandate for "reactive use of force" rather than for "pro-active use of force."

Third, the purpose of use of force is not to achieve reunification but to oppose secessionism. If we compare this law with Beijing's White Paper of January 2001, which was entitled The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Problem, we will find there have been several changes in the definition of the "bottom line."

First, the White Paper lists "the Taiwan authorities' refusal, sine die, to enter into negotiations over reunification" as the third "bottom line" scenario. This is modified under the current law to "all possibilities for a peaceful reunification have been completely exhausted," an indication of "raising the threshold of use of force" as discussed earlier.

The second change is that the previous White Paper specifies the purpose of the use of force as "accomplishing the great cause of reunification," which the law does not mention at all. This indicates that even the adoption of "non-peaceful means" is not aimed at realizing reunification once and for all.

Rather, once the Taiwan authorities agree to Beijing's position that "both sides of the Taiwan Straits belong to one and the same China," then the mainland would, in all likelihood, stop military action and resort to negotiations again.

(China Daily 04/19/2005 page6)

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