Perception gap over Taiwan's referendum
dongxiao  Updated: 2004-03-13 08:50

Since President Bush publicly rebuked Mr. Chen Shuibian for his intention of unilaterally challenging the status quo of the Taiwan Strait during his meeting with the visiting Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao last December, Washington seemed to have been happy with "every-thing-back-to -normal track" across the Strait. Beijing continues to behave itself very well by restraining from any saber rattling or even harsh words directing at Taipei. Mr. Chen Shui-bian, meanwhile, has been perceived by Washington to moderate his provocative position by reassuring Washington of his adherence to "Five-No" commitment even if he will move ahead to hold the referendum as scheduled. So, as some US officials hold, Washington has shifted its policy focus to post-March 20th (the election day in Taiwan). However, Washington's "sigh-of-relief" policy before March 20th has quite confused Beijing and will be proved as a wishful thinking in the end.

Beijing's calmness and restraint up to now regarding Mr. Chen and DPP members' insistence on referendum on March 20th is based upon an assumption that United States this time has finally seen through the independence intention embedded in Mr. Chen's referendums strategy and will use its unique leverage to help stop the process. Beijing particularly appreciated President Bush's public criticisms on Mr. Chen and since then expected that the pressure would maintain its momentum. What's more, Beijing also has linked Washington's handling Taiwan's referendum issue to testing Bush administration's credibility in its relations with China. Despite the pro-Taiwan forces in Congress and change of priority of President Bush's political agenda after meeting with Premier Wen, Beijing assumes and believes that Washington should not have been so politically naive to be fooled again by Mr. Chen's empty reassurance with only moderating the wording of referendum. Otherwise, Beijing would be totally disillusioned, not by Washington's political naiveté but rather by its incredibility in handling the issue. Beijing has been feeling increasingly concerned and frustrated, however, by the emerging signs of backlash within Washington since Premier Wen's visit.

It has been clear that Washington has now attributed strife between Washington and Taipei over referendums mainly to the bad communication between them. Such an explanation only manifests itself how huge a perception gap between Washington and Beijing over the same issue. Fundamentally speaking, Beijing is firmly confirmed that the referendum to be held in March 20th, in whatever names or facade, will open the door for a series of other referendums in the future leading up to de jure independence someday, which the Mainland won't tolerate. Meanwhile Washington has tended to believe that referendum is a democratic way of freedom, therefore Washington has no legitimacy to intervene as long as there is no referendum on independence per se on the island. Second, Beijing has believed that the so called "Five-No" commitment promised by Mr. Chen is nothing but empty words and has already been hollowed out in the past four years by Mr. Chen's creeping independence initiatives. However, Washington still holds that Five-No's assurance by Taipei will help rule out the possibility of unilaterally changing the status quo of the Strait. Third, Beijing has stressed that Mr. Chen and his pro-independence followers are mainly responsible for the tensions across the Strait and identifies him as another troublemaker, while Washington has maintained that Mr. Chen has just represented identity transformation of Taiwan people, and criticizes Beijing of misunderstanding and personalizing overall democratic dynamic within the island. Last but not least, Beijing perceived that Mr. Chen's moderate wording made no substantial change about his referendum strategy, while Washington seems to be convinced that Mr. Chen has retreated from his previous position and stop challenge the status quo.

Both Beijing and Washington have been watching Taiwan's upcoming election and referendum very closely. Nevertheless, the understanding gap between two sides over the same issue is huge and will make the policy accommodation between Washington and Beijing increasingly difficult. Beijing can hardly tolerate the referendum that favors pro-independence force in Taiwan after March 20th and will turn its screws by itself to prevent the worst scenario in Taiwan unless Washington can keep up its pressure to help stop the process. Meanwhile, since Washington has been reassured by Taiwan authority about the prospect of no unilateral challenge of the status quo in the running up to the election, it would be less likely to impose more public pressures as Beijing would expect. What's more, Washington has already turned to admonish Beijing not to take any provocative action against Taiwan's election and its referendum. Unless Washington fully realizes the seriousness of perception gap between two sides and keeps up more close consultation with Beijing to address China's concerns, the tension of policy conflicts over referendum will be mounting.

The above content represents the view of the author only.

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