CIA boss: Iraq never an imminent threat (Agencies) Updated: 2004-02-06 08:42 Intelligence analysts never told U.S. President
George W. Bush before the invasion of Iraq that Saddam Hussein's
rule posed an imminent threat, CIA Director George Tenet said Thursday in a
heated defense of agency findings central to the decision to go to war.
The urgency of the Iraqi threat was Bush's main argument for the war. But the
president said Thursday he still would have invaded Iraq if he'd known no
weapons stockpiles existed — adding a new element to the much-debated question
of whether the United States went to war based on faulty assumptions.
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CIA Director Geprge Tenet speaks at
Georgetown Univeristy in Washington Thursday, Feb. 5, 2004. In his first
public defense of prewar intelligence, Tenet said U.S. analysts never
claimed before the war that Iraq posed an imminent threat.
[AFP] | Tenet, addressing such questions for the
first time after weeks of silence, acknowledged that analysts believed before
the war that Saddam had chemical and biological weapons, although none have been
found. He said he believes some of what U.S. intelligence predicted about Iraq
will turn out to have been right — and some wrong — as is often the case in such
matters.
He made clear that analysts differed among themselves all along on important
aspects of Saddam's chemical, biological and nuclear programs and spelled out
those disputes in an October 2002 intelligence estimate given to the White
House.
"They never said there was an imminent threat," Tenet said in a speech at
Georgetown University. "Rather, they painted an objective assessment for our
policy-makers of a brutal dictator who was continuing his efforts to deceive and
build programs that might constantly surprise us and threaten our interests."
Tenet's remarks hit back at his former special adviser on Iraqi weapons,
David Kay, who said last month "we were almost all wrong" about Iraq's weapons
of mass destruction.
The comments also seemed designed to inoculate the CIA from becoming a
scapegoat in the fight over whether the war was justified.
Speaking in Charleston, S.C., Bush acknowledged that the weapons have not
been found, although investigators have discovered evidence of possible
programs. He said the war was still justified.
"Knowing what I knew then and knowing what I know today, America did the
right thing in Iraq," Bush said.
Tenet, in his 40-minute defense, never said in detail how the Bush
administration, citing U.S. intelligence, might have painted an inaccurate
picture of Iraq's weapons arsenal. He insisted that the intelligence analysts
had not tailored their findings for any political purpose.
That leaves the door open for Democrats to demand more investigation and
explanation, and for many to question the basis of the administration's
pre-emptive strike doctrine.
"It goes to the core of why a nation went to war," said Democratic
presidential front-runner, Massachusetts Sen. John Kerry (news - web sites).
Before the war, Bush and his senior advisers made clear they viewed the
threat from Saddam as urgent.
In October 2002, Bush told an audience in Ohio that "the danger is already
significant and it only grows worse with time. If we know Saddam Hussein has
dangerous weapons today — and we do — does it make any sense for the world to
wait to confront him as he grows even stronger and develops even more dangerous
weapons?"
On Sept. 13 of that year, Bush said of Saddam, "He's a threat we must deal
with as quickly as possible."
White House aides have pointed out that Bush, while he cited the urgency of
Saddam's threat, never called the threat "imminent."
In his State of the Union address in January 2003, Bush said: "Some have said
we must not act until the threat is imminent. Since when have terrorists and
tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they
strike? If this threat is permitted to fully and suddenly emerge, all actions,
all words and all recriminations would come too late."
In general, the Bush administration before the war cited three main
justifications for military action: preventing Iraq from using weapons of mass
destruction, protecting America from terrorists and liberating Iraqis from a
repressive regime.
Tenet's speech came at a sensitive time.
Bush was expected to announce Friday a nine-member panel to look at the Iraq
intelligence and weapons proliferation issues worldwide. An administration
official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said Sen. John McCain,
R-Ariz., would be a member. Republicans on the Senate Intelligence Committee,
led by Pat Roberts of Kansas, are also completing work on a report detailing
intelligence mistakes. They shared it with members in a closed session Thursday.
Democrats want to focus on whether analysts were pressured by the White House
to justify an invasion. At the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on
Thursday, Kay said he doesn't believe analysts' arms were twisted, but he said
the president's commission should look into whether political leaders
manipulated the intelligence data given them. "I think that is an important
question that needs to be understood," he said.
Tenet, who was appointed by former U.S. President Bill Clinton, made his
own pre-emptive strike: "No one told us what to say or how to say it."
Like Bush and other administration officials, Tenet wouldn't rule out that
weapons still may be found. "Despite some public statements, we are nowhere near
85 percent finished," he said rebutting Kay's figure.
As chief of the CIA and 13 other agencies that make up the intelligence
community, Tenet conceded that there were mistakes. Analysts, for instance,
overlooked a notice that one source providing information on Iraq's weapons of
mass destruction was unreliable, he said.
On chemical and biological weapons, Tenet said analysts believed before the
war that Saddam had programs and perhaps stockpiles, but investigators have
found no evidence of such production. He said two sources with high-level access
told the CIA in fall 2002, shortly before the war, that Iraq was producing
biological and chemical weapons.
While Tenet conceded that U.S. intelligence agencies never penetrated
Saddam's inner circle, those sources solidified his personal view that Saddam
was a danger, he said. "Could I have dismissed such reports at the time?
Absolutely not," he said.
Going into more detail than intelligence chiefs normally do, Tenet also
claimed agency successes, including:
_ The U.S. penetration of Libya's network of foreign suppliers for its
weapons of mass destruction. That led the agency into developments indicating
Libya's programs were no longer on a back burner, Tenet said.
_ A CIA spy who led the U.S. to Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the al-Qaida
mastermind of the Sept. 11 attacks.
_ Human sources that led to the arrest of Nashiri, al-Qaida's operational
chief in the Persian Gulf who planned the USS Cole attack, and to the capture of
Hambali, a chief terrorist in South Asia.
"A blanket indictment of our human intelligence around the world is dead
wrong," Tenet said. "We have spent the last seven years rebuilding our
clandestine service."
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